The Ethics of Aquinas

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The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6–17)

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At the heart of Aquinas's ethics lies the will. Moral acts are willed acts, for as Thomas teaches at the very beginning of his treatise on the moral life, moral acts are identical with human acts—acts which proceed from intellect and will (Ia IIae, q. 1, aa. 1, 3). Where the will does not operate, action has no moral quality whatsoever and falls back into the category of mere natural activity (Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 3). And even in moral actions, external acts have a moral quality only because they have been commanded by the will (Ia IIae, q. 20, aa. 1–3). Thus moral goodness is located first and foremost in the will. Indeed, for Thomas a person is said to be good or bad simply, i.e., morally, on the basis of his will, for it is through the will that everything else in the person is used well or badly (Ia, q. 48, a. 6). In sum, moral action is willed action and morally good action arises from a good will (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3).[1]

This centrality of the will is evident when Thomas presents his description of the subject matter of moral philosophy at the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. In this work, he maintains that every branch of philosophy treats a certain order; logic, for example, deals with the order which reason puts into its own acts of thinking. Moral philosophy, he says, treats the order that is found in voluntary actions, and consequently it considers "human operations insofar as they are ordered to one another and to the end." By "human operations," Thomas goes on to say, are understood those actions "which proceed from the will according to the order of reason." He concludes that "the subject of moral philosophy is human operation ordered to the end, or even man taken as voluntarily acting for the end." Hence, *willed action*, or the person as the source of willed action, is the subject of study in ethics.[2]

It comes as no surprise, then, that Thomas should devote an extended discussion to the will and willed action (Ia IIae, qq. 6–17). Nor is it surprising to find the will appearing prominently in all the other major aspects of his moral theory. In the treatise on happiness, he maintains that rectitude of the will—the proper ordination to God—is a prerequisite for beatitude; in fact, one might consider his ethics to be nothing more than an account of how one achieves that rectitude (Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 4). The moral significance of the passions lies in their relationship to the will, either as inclining the will to a certain kind of choice or as being themselves incited or repressed by the will (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 1). In the treatment of the virtues, Thomas explains that the moral virtues are located only in the will or in powers whose acts can be commanded by the will (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3). So too, sin occurs primarily in the will itself and only derivatively in the acts of the other powers insofar as they are commanded by the will; there is no sin where there is no will (Ia IIae, q. 74, aa. 1–3). Finally, Thomas begins his treatment of law, claiming that law, by definition, is a principle of human acts, that is, acts that proceed from the will (Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 1; SCG III, chap. 114).

For a clear understanding of Thomas's ethics, then, it is necessary to have an accurate grasp of the will and its functions. In what follows, I will attempt to achieve this by examining Aquinas's understanding of the will in general; in what ways the will is free and in what ways necessitated in its action, a theme Thomas deals with at great length; the various acts of the will as they are described

arises from a will directed by an intellect formed by the virtue of prudence

in Ia IIae, qq. 6–17; and finally, how love is the first affection of the will and the implications of this point for understanding the moral life.

THE NATURE OF THE WILL

In one way, the will may be understood simply as that power or faculty of the soul by which a human agent is in control of his actions. For Aquinas, properly human actions are those actions over which a person has control (*dominium*; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1). To have control means that when the person acts, it is possible to act otherwise or not to act at all. This mode of acting is contrasted to the mode of nature in which an agent is determined to act in only one way and cannot do otherwise than it does, as occurs in the instinctual behavior of animals. As Thomas says, "the will is distinguished from nature as one cause from another; some things are done naturally and some voluntarily. The mode of causing of the will which is master (*dominus*) of its acts is other than that of nature which is determined to one" (Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1).[3]

The will here is taken, we might say, as the source of the voluntariness of all voluntary action. There are many voluntary actions, actions in the control of the agent, which are acts of powers other than the will. When a person walks or eats these are acts not of the will but of the body; so too, if a person thinks, remembers, or imagines these are respectively acts of the intellect, of the memory, or of the imagination, all powers distinct from the will. Nevertheless, such actions can be voluntary, and these powers do not themselves account for the voluntariness of their own actions; the imagination, for example, does not account for the fact that someone can control whether or not he will use his imagination nor do the bodily powers alone account for the ability he has to decide to walk. One accounts for this control by appealing to another power, a power whose proper act it is to *choose* either to imagine or not to imagine, to walk or not to walk. This power is the will. Thomas often presents the will in this way, taking it as the source of voluntariness. To so understand the will is to take it as *free-will* (*liberum arbitrium*), the term he assigns to the will when it is considered precisely as the source of free or fully voluntary action (Ia, q. 83, aa. 3–4).[4]

Thomas presents the will, however, not only as *free-will*, but more fundamentally as *rational appetite*. Hence, to understand his theory of the will, we must place it within the larger context of his general theory of appetition. For Aquinas every being has a determinate appetite corresponding to the kind of being that it is. He bases this doctrine on the empirical observation that each kind of thing has typical motions and rests along with the recognition that the source of these motions and rests is internal to the thing. To take the simplest example, stones generally fall toward the middle of the earth, and if they actually arrive at that point they will tend to stay or rest there. Stones or any heavy body have *an internal source of motion* toward some determinate condition in which, when it is achieved, they will rest. Such bodies may move in other directions, but only if they are moved from outside (violent motion); their motion from the internal source is toward some definite place. This internal source of motion, this internal tending or inclining, is exactly what Thomas understands by appetite.[5]

Thomas distinguishes three levels of appetite. The first, of the sort just described, operates without any cognition on the part of the being which has the inclination. Thomas calls this "natural inclination" or "natural appetite." This kind of appetite is found in all beings not endowed with cognition; the direction of the appetite is determined by the thing's natural form. The second level of appetite is found in beings endowed with sense cognition. In such beings—the brute animals—there is a tending or inclination that follows upon cognition; the animals respond appetitively to stimuli received through the senses (including the internal senses). Aquinas calls this kind of appetite "sensitive appetite." It is here at the level of the sense appetite that Thomas first postulates a distinct appetitive power of the soul, for the inclination or tendency experienced by the animal is not simply the result of its natural form but rather arises upon the apprehension of some object (Ia, q. 80, aa. 1–2). Just how the appetite responds to the apprehended object depends, in the case of animals, on their natural instincts, what Aquinas refers to as the "natural judg-

ment" (*iudicium naturale*) of the "estimative power" (Ia, q. 83, a. 1).[6]

The third level of appetite is "rational appetite," that found in beings endowed with reason. As in the previous two levels, there is an internal source of motion, a tending or inclination, but here the good can be apprehended at the level of intellect—grasped under some universal formality of goodness—and so the agent can tend toward the good by means of an appetite distinct from sensitive appetite. Thomas nicely summarizes the three levels while discussing the angelic will:

> Some things incline toward the good with only a natural relationship to it and without cognition, as is the case with plants and inanimate bodies. Such an inclination is called "natural appetite." Some things, however, incline toward the good with a certain cognition, not such that they know the intelligibility (*ratio*) itself of the good, but they know some particular good, like the power of sense which knows the sweet thing and the white thing or something of this sort. The inclination which follows this cognition is called "sensitive appetite." Some things incline toward the good with a cognition by which they know the intelligibility (*ratio*) itself of the good, and this is proper to intellect. And these things tend most perfectly toward the good, not as if merely directed by another toward the good like those things which lack cognition, nor only toward particular goods like those things in which there is only sense cognition, but as if inclined toward the universal good itself. And this inclination is called "will."[7] (Ia, q. 59, a. 1)

The nature of the will as a rational appetite can be clarified through comparison with the sensitive appetite. The two appetites are similar in that, first, both follow upon apprehension and, second, both are distinct powers of the soul as opposed to natural inclination which simply follows upon a natural form. Third, both are appetites of the whole being and not simply of one part. In an objection against positing any distinct appetitive powers, Thomas entertains the argument that every power of the soul already has a natural appetite for its own object: hearing for sounds, sight for colors, the intellect for truth, and so on. Hence it seems superfluous to posit, over and above these powers, another appetitive power whose object is the desirable taken generally (*appetibile in communi*). To this objection, Thomas responds that while it is indeed the case that each power, being a certain form or nature, has a natural inclination to its own object, there is still the need for an appetite following upon apprehension by which the animal tends toward objects not just as suitable to a particular power, but as suitable *to the animal simply or as a whole* (Ia, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3).[8]

It now becomes evident that both the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite, as distinct appetitive powers, are powers by which the being that possesses them tends toward that which is good for that being as such; these appetites are appetites of the whole and not simply of any one part. In the case of the will, this point implies that whenever a person wills, one wills that which is good (at least apparently) for oneself as a whole. Even if the good willed is the object of another power as, for example, when someone wills to acquire some truth, that object is willed as being good not just for that other power but as good for the whole person. In willing to pursue this truth, the person is implicitly saying that on the whole, he or she will be better off with this truth than without it. The will, then, *by its very nature as an appetite*, is ordained to the perfection of the person in which it is found, just as the sensitive appetite is ordained to the perfection of the animal in which it is found. In fact, it is impossible to will anything at all that is not taken to be a part of or means to the perfection of the willing person.

While similar, the will and the sensitive appetite are nevertheless different in important ways. These differences follow from the basic difference in the types of apprehension. Sense knowledge, for Aquinas, is always of singulars as such. On the other hand it is proper to intellectual knowledge to grasp universals and to grasp any singular thing under the formality of a universal: as "dog," or as "cat," or as "warm," or as "friendly," and so on. Thus, while the sensitive appetites tend toward particular things that are perceived by the senses to be sensibly pleasant or painful, the will tends toward things insofar as they are seen at the rational level to be good; whatever is willed is taken *as good*, as falling under the formality of the good as such and usually under some more specific formality such as the honest good, the

pleasant good, or the useful good.[9] As a result of this difference between the apprehensive powers, a person can will a good which cannot be the object of a sense power, as for example, in willing to understand the Pythagorean Theorem. It also is possible that the same object, taken materially, be the object of both the sense appetites and the will. But here the formality under which it is desired is not the same for the two appetites. For example, I may desire to eat an apple at the sense level simply because at the sense level it appears sensibly pleasant. But at the level of rational appetite, I can will to eat the apple because I understand it to be healthy or as a way to please a friend who has offered it to me. In these latter cases, I will to eat the apple, but under some intellectually grasped formality such as "healthy" or "pleasing to my friend" (Ia, q. 80, a. 2, ad 2). For Thomas, as I will demonstrate, it is also this necessarily universal aspect of the willed object that underlies the will's freedom of choice, a freedom not found in the sensitive appetites.

This universal aspect of the will's object, especially the universal good (*bonum universale*; *bonum in commune*), also enables the will to be the appetite of the whole person, what we might call a "personal appetite." Whatever the will wills, it wills as being somehow good, in technical terms, as falling under the formality of good (*sub ratione boni*). Any and all goods of the person, even if they are first objects of other powers, thus become objects of the will. The will, consequently, plays an integrative role with respect to the acts of all the other powers of the soul. All the goods that are objects of the other powers (for example, truth, sensible pleasures, bodily motions) need to be integrated into the overall good of the person. The will carries out this integration by commanding the acts of the other powers. It is by will that a person decides whether or not to engage in those acts at all, and if so, to what extent, when, where, etc. (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1). Of course, this control is not absolute; there are some powers (for example, the vegetative powers of growth and nutrition) outside the will's control, and others, like the sensitive appetites, have motions of their own apart from being commanded by the will. Nevertheless, even the latter cannot bring about actions of the person as such except by the permission of the will (Ia, q. 81, a. 3). It is therefore by the will that a given person integrates all the partial human goods into his overall good. It follows, as an immediate consequence, that the person as a whole is said to be good or evil on the basis of the will; one is said to be good simply (*simpliciter*)—morally good—when one's will is properly oriented toward the good (Ia, q. 48, a. 6).[10]

Thomas's doctrine that the will always seeks the good or perfection of the willer and integrates all partial goods into that larger good may lead to a certain misunderstanding. As discussed above, an appetitive power is directed to the good or perfection of the being in which it is found, and so one might infer that all beings, and especially human beings, are naturally egoistic and seek always and in everything exclusively their own individual good. It may even seem that it is impossible to tend toward any good except one's own good, and that every good that is willed is willed as directed to one's own individual good. But this is not, in fact, Thomas's view, for he maintains that one's good is not limited to one's individual good but can include the good of other beings outside oneself. It is indeed true for him that each thing seeks its own individual perfection, but it seeks even more the good of its species, and yet more the good of the whole universe. For example, when the mother exposes herself to danger for the sake of her offspring as is common among the animals, it is clear that the preservation of the species takes precedence over the good of the individual. And since each species is for the sake of the universe as a whole, the individual seeks the common good of the universe above all else. Individual beings are all parts of the larger whole that is the universe and as such they naturally should find their perfection not primarily in their own individual good but rather in the perfection of that whole (Ia, q. 60, a. 5, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 3). Thus, to say that appetite is necessarily directed to a being's perfection does not mean at all that beings, especially human beings, are self-seeking individualists. This point is crucial for Thomas's understanding of appetite in general and the will in particular.

In sum, the will is the power by which a rational being tends toward its proper good or perfection. In this sense, the will is rational

appetite. But insofar as rational beings have control over their actions, the rational appetite can also be taken as free choice. And so we can succinctly define the will as the power or capacity by which a rational being—a person—freely directs his actions to his good or perfection.

NATURE AND FREEDOM IN THE WILL'S ACTS

As I have shown, when the will is taken precisely as the source of free choices it is called *free-will*. Whether or not human agents possess the power to choose freely is not a question that Thomas treats at any great length, since he considers it obvious that humans engage in actions they could do otherwise or not do at all. As he says in *De veritate*, it is manifest that man freely chooses one thing and rejects another (Ia, q. 24, a. 1). The closest Thomas comes to proving the existence of free acts is to defend them negatively, that is, to point out the consequences of denying their existence. To deny free action, action in the power of the agent, is tantamount to denying morality itself and all moral philosophy: "If there is nothing free in us but we are moved necessarily to will, then we destroy deliberation, exhortation, precepts and punishments, and praise and blame, the very things with which moral philosophy deals."[11] What is more, we also remove the possibility of merit and demerit, so that from the theological point of view such a position is heretical. Thomas classes the denial of free action among the "extraneous opinions" of philosophy, opinions that deny the possibility of a particular science by denying its very subject matter.[12] Thomas's usual concern, then, when he deals with free actions, is not whether they exist, but rather how they exist. That is, he analyzes the structure of the cognitive and appetitive powers required for such actions. It is this analysis that leads to the distinction between the will's free acts and its natural acts.

Among the free acts of the will, the principle one is choice (*electio*), for it is by choice that a person actually commits himself to one action or another. Before the choice, there is deliberation about what is to be done but not yet the doing of the act; after choice, there is the execution of the chosen act. Only in the act of choice itself does a person effectively determine himself to the pursuit of some particular good. But choice, for Aquinas, has a determinate structure. Following Aristotle's analysis, Thomas holds that choice is always of means to an end. In the light of an end to be achieved, a person chooses among at least two possible means. Thus reference to an end is essential to the structure of choice, since it is only in light of an end that one can choose between the possible means; the means chosen is that which somehow promises better to achieve the given end. Hence, choice always has these three elements: a given end to be achieved and (at least) two possible means to achieve it. The two possible means may be two different acts (radiation versus chemotherapy to treat a cancer), or may simply be the options of acting versus not acting (treating the cancer versus not treating it at all; Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3).

In the act of choice, the person who chooses is actually willing both the chosen means and the end for the sake of which it is chosen. As we shall see below, Thomas calls the willing of the end "intention." Every act of choice, consequently, necessarily presupposes an act of intention. How, then, does it happen that a person comes to will the particular end he intends in a given choice? It is this question that leads to the will's natural acts. It may be that the end now intended is being intended because of a previous choice. Someone may now be choosing between the train and the airplane because of a previous choice to go to Chicago. Here again, however, there had to be some end that influenced the choice to go to Chicago. On what basis is that further end intended? It may be a yet earlier choice, but it quickly becomes clear that this process cannot go on infinitely. There must be some end that a person wills, not as the result of any choice but prior to all choices (Ia IIae, q. 1, aa. 4–6; q. 13, a. 3).

The act of the will that precedes and underlies all choices is, according to Thomas, the will's "natural appetite" or "natural inclination." Just as in the demonstrations of science there must be some first principles to which the intellect naturally assents, so too among the acts of the will there must be some act(s) in which the will is moved naturally and not in the mode of *free-will*, that is, acts wherein the

will has no power to act otherwise (Ia, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 5; q. 10, a. 1). Moreover, as the above line of reasoning implies, the first object of the will, as first, must be the end to which the objects of all other acts of the will are directed (Ia, q. 60, a. 2). This object is, according to Thomas, the last end (*finis ultimus*) or beatitude (*beatitudo*). Whatever a person may choose, he or she necessarily chooses it as somehow contributing to his or her goodness or perfection, and beatitude is the name given to that state in which a person possesses her or his good completely or perfectly, the state in which no good due to her or his nature is lacking and no inclination of the will is unsatisfied (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 6).[13]

That the object of the will's natural appetite or inclination should be the good that constitutes that person's perfection is perfectly consistent with the notion of the will as an appetitive power. It belongs, as I said earlier, to the nature of appetite to be directed to the good or perfection of the being in which it exists. Accordingly, the most basic inclination of the appetite is toward the complete good or perfection of that being. But the fact that the will is *rational* appetite adds another dimension to this natural inclination, viz., that the inclination's object is not any specific form of beatitude, but simply beatitude in general (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 7; q. 5, a. 8). As I pointed out earlier, the mark of rational cognition is that it can grasp universals, and, as a natural consequence, rational appetite is directed to generalities, especially the good in general and to particular goods as falling under the desired generality. In the case at hand, the will's natural inclination is directed toward the ultimate end or beatitude in general: "there is put into man an appetite for his last end in general (*appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi*), that is, he naturally desires to be complete in goodness."[14] Whether a person seeks his beatitude in some particular good such as bodily pleasure, knowledge, or God is a matter of free choice. By his natural inclination a person wills simply to be fulfilled or happy: all people "wish to have their perfection fulfilled which is the intelligibility (*ratio*) of the last end" (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 7).[15]

It is important to emphasize here that the object of the will's natural inclination is not some specific good but a general formality, since this fact provides the ultimate basis for the will's freedom. In this vein, Thomas raises an interesting objection in the context of discussing the will's natural inclination. According to the objection, the will cannot have any natural motion since nature—what occurs always or for the most part—is determined to one (*determinata ad unum*), while the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). To have a natural motion, then, would seem to be against the very nature of the will. Thomas replies that nature is indeed always ordered to some one thing, but that that one thing is proportionate to the nature in question. Since the will is a rational appetite and reason is open to universals or generalities, it follows that the one to which the will is determined in its natural motion is also something general (*aliquod unum commune*). This something general is nothing other than the good in general. But a universal of this sort can contain within it many particulars; there are many particular goods that fit within the good taken in general. And so, Thomas concludes, the will, while naturally determined to the good in general, is not determined by nature to any of the particular goods. With respect to them it remains free (q. 10, a. 1, ad 3).

This is Thomas's most fundamental explanation for the will's freedom and its basis in the natural inclination. Because the will tends toward beatitude in general or toward the perfect good in general, it remains free with respect to any specific form of beatitude or good. Each person must choose what specific good will be, for him, his ultimate end, and precisely this choice is the most fundamental of all moral choices (q. 89, a. 6). All subsequent choices made in light of the ultimate end have a similar structure; therefore, they too are free. In each case the will (as rational appetite) is directed first to some generality, and then, by deliberation, seeks the instantiation that best fits that generality. In *De malo*, Thomas presents this reasoning in its clearest form:

> an understood form is a universal under which many things can be comprehended. And since acts take place among singulars, in which there is nothing that is adequate to a universal power, the inclination of the will remains undeter-

> mined with respect to many, just as, when an architect conceives the form of a house universally, under which different shapes of houses are contained, his will can incline toward making a square house or toward making a round house or a house of another shape.[16]

Thomas's example can, it seems, be taken as representative of how choices are made. There is some good that is desired under a general formality; a particular good is then selected which best instantiates or embodies the desired good. So, for example, a woman wishes to travel to Chicago, and consequently looks for a means to do so. At this point, she desires a general good: a-way-to-travel-to-Chicago. After investigating the possible ways, that is, the particulars that fit under this universal, she chooses that one which seems best to instantiate the good she is seeking. This good may be complex, including many elements such as cost, ease, speed, among others, but it remains the case that she wills this complex good first in general and then finds, by deliberation, the particular instance that best embodies that complex good. Thomas gives clear expression to this understanding of willing when he says, in *De veritate*, that the will tends directly toward the reason for the desirability (*ratio appetibilitatis*) such as goodness or utility and only secondarily toward this or that thing insofar as it participates in the reason for the desirability.[17]

The only object, then, that the will necessarily intends is beatitude in general. This is true, however, only in the present life. According to Thomas, the will also moves naturally toward God when, in the next life, under the influence of grace, it is presented with the vision of God's essence. His reasoning is that, in seeing God, the will is presented with the perfect good, the good that contains all possible goodness. Since the universal good is the natural object of the will, the will, when presented with it, moves toward it naturally (Ia, q. 62, a. 8). Under the conditions of the present life, however, one does not grasp God in this fashion. It is possible then to think that one's good is to be found outside of God; therefore, it is also possible not to will (love) God (q. 82, a. 2). Other than these two objects, beatitude in general and God seen in His essence, all objects are willed freely, that is, they must be chosen. Thomas refers to these "other" objects as particular goods, that is, goods that do not contain in themselves all goodness. He also refers to them as means to the end (*ea quae sunt ad finem*), because a person wills any such good as a way or means to achieve his beatitude. Thus Thomas commonly states that the will necessarily wills the good in general or beatitude and has freedom of choice with respect to particular goods or the means to the end (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 6).[18]

The analysis of free action does not end with showing how the will's free acts are based on its natural act. Thomas goes a step further and within the free act describes two distinct ways in which necessity or lack of necessity can be present: in the "exercise" of the act and in its "specification."

The distinction between "exercise" and "specification," one that Thomas used increasingly over the course of his career, is not peculiar to the will.[19] It actually applies to almost any power of the soul, especially in rational beings, who possess other powers that can be exercised by the will. Generally speaking, exercise refers to the fact that a power is actually eliciting an act; to take the power of sight, for example, to say the power is exercised is to say there is an act of seeing. Specification, on the other hand, refers to the act's being directed to one object or another. In the act of seeing, the seeing will be directed to this object or that object. "Specification" is used because Thomas believes that actions are the kind of actions they are—are specified—by the objects at which they aim. This distinction between exercise and specification should not be understood as one between two different acts that could occur separately or even two acts that are always together; rather, they are two aspects of a single act. The act of the power is at once exercised and specified (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1).

What interests Thomas in this distinction is the difference in the sources or causes of an act's exercise and of its specification. The specification of the act comes from the side of the object. To continue with the example of sight, what a person sees is determined by the object in front of him. Exercise, on the other hand, has its source in the agent. Whether or not someone has an act of seeing depends upon that person. This is especially the case in beings endowed with a will. The object of the will, as

we have seen, is the good in general which contains, so to speak, all particular goods. The acts of all powers are particular goods and as such fall within the will's all-embracing object. Consequently, the will has the capacity to exercise or not exercise the acts of the other powers (ibid.). This is the basis for the will's integrative function.

One will also find this distinction between exercise and specification located in the will itself. The will's act is specified by its object. And since the will is a *rational* appetite, its object is supplied to it by reason. Consequently, Thomas says that the will's act is specified by the intellect. In this way, by providing it with its object, the intellect is said to move the will. This "movement" occurs in the order of formal causality (ibid.). On the other hand, in the line of exercise—efficient causality—the will moves itself. Apart from the will's first natural act, which comes from God, the will exercises its own act, just as it exercises the acts of the other powers. Whether or not there will be an act of the will with respect to any particular object lies with the will itself (Ia IIae, q. 9, aa. 3–6). This power of the will to move itself is crucial to Thomas's account of the will's freedom, for it provides the basis for a person's capacity to refuse to will any good.

It is now possible to describe Thomas's understanding of the interrelationship of the intellect and the will, another pivotal point for understanding Thomas's theory of the will. The intellect is said to move the will in that it specifies the will's act by providing the will its object (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1).[20] The will, on the other hand, is able to move the intellect by exercising the intellect's act; that a person thinks at all or even thinks about one object or another (this is called consideration) depends upon the will. At any point, the will can move the intellect to think about some object or to stop thinking about it altogether. Still, the specification of the intellect's act comes from the object; therefore, what one concludes as true about a particular object when one considers it might not be dependent on the will. In the case of the intellect's assent to first principles and the conclusions of scientific demonstrations, for example, if there is willed consideration of these propositions, there is natural assent (Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6).[21] This power of the will to exercise the intellect's act is important for the question of whether Thomas's "intellectualist" understanding of the will falls into the trap of intellectual determinism. Precisely because the will can control whether or not a possible act will be considered or even from which point of view it will be considered, the presentation of the intellectually understood object to the will becomes itself a voluntary matter (Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3; q. 10, aa. 2–3).

I will return now to the question of freedom and necessity in the will's acts. Thomas discusses this question both in terms of the will exercising its act and in terms of the specification of that act. What sort of necessity is there, then, with respect to the exercise of the will's act? Is there any act that the will must necessarily exercise? To this, Thomas says no. It may seem that for a given object, there must necessarily be some act either toward or away from it, and, in this sense, the will must exercise its act. But since the will's act depends upon the intellect's presentation of the object, and because the will can command the act of the intellect, it is possible, for any given proposed act, simply to will to cease thinking about the object and so to obviate all acts in its regard.[22] This can occur, says Thomas, even if the object is beatitude itself. Since the act of thinking about beatitude is only a particular good, it is possible for the will to choose not to engage in it, that is, not to command the thinking, and then there will simply be no act of the will in regard to beatitude. In this way, then, the will remains free with respect to the exercise of any of its acts (Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2).

With regard to specification, the issue is more complicated. The sort of necessity in question here is the following: for a given object of the will, can it be either approved (i.e. loved, desired, rejoiced in) or disapproved (hated, rejected, sorrowed over), or must it necessarily be only one of these? For example, with an object such as an act of adultery, it may be desired as being pleasant, yet it may also be rejected as being contrary to the law of God. So too, the good work of a colleague may be cause for rejoicing because it helps the whole firm or may be cause for sorrow because that colleague might receive more honor than I. In such cases, Thomas argues, there is no necessity present in the way in which the will's act is specified. The same object can be willed in

various ways depending upon how the object is considered. If there were, however, some object that was good and desirable from all points of view, then it would not be possible to will that object in just any way, but only to love, desire, or rejoice in it.

Thomas points to two such objects. First, there is beatitude considered in general. Because the very concept of beatitude is to possess all the good of which one is capable while lacking no good, such an object cannot be seen in any way other than as good. It is not possible to think of beatitude and not desire or rejoice in it. It is of course, as I have said, possible not to think of it and so exercise no act in its regard, but if one thinks of it one will desire it. Second, there is God seen in the divine essence as occurs in the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*). Here again, it will be evident that all good that is to be found anywhere besides God is found more perfectly in God; and, that all possible goodness is to be found there. The willer thus sees that his or her total good is to be found in God and nowhere else, and so there is no possible reason to reject God. Apart from these two objects, however, all objects can possibly be seen as evil, if only because pursuing them conflicts with the attainment of some other good. Thus, for all other objects, there is no necessity in willing them either from the point of view of exercising the will's act in their regard, or tending toward or away from them if there is such an act (ibid.; *De malo*, q. 6).

Before leaving the topic of the will's free and natural acts, it is necessary to take up another set of acts of the will which Thomas describes as being natural. There are, he says, certain objects of the will besides beatitude or the good in general toward which the will naturally tends, in some cases even with a certain necessity. These are goods which are particular in the sense of not being themselves the good which wholly beatifies, but they are seen to have a necessary connection with beatitude. The clearest description of these goods comes in the *Prima secundae*, in which Thomas delineates the objects which move the will naturally:

> This [what is willed naturally] is the good in general toward which the will naturally tends just like any power toward its own object; and also the final end itself which stands among appetible objects in the same way as the first principles of demonstration among intelligibles; and universally all those things which are suitable to the willer according to his nature. For we desire by our will not only those things that pertain to the power of the will, but even those which pertain to the individual powers and to the man as a whole. Whence man naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also other objects which are suitable to the other powers, such as the knowledge of the truth, and existing and living and other things of this sort that have to do with one's natural well being. All these things are comprehended under the object of the will as so many particular goods.[23] (Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 1)

The general principle here is that a person naturally wills whatever is suitable (*conveniens*) to human nature. Human nature being complex, many distinct goods are included. The first are the objects of all the other powers besides the will. Each power naturally tends toward its object, as for example, the intellect naturally tends toward the truth, and the sense appetites toward what is sensibly pleasant. As objects of these powers and of the powers' natural inclinations, such things are naturally seen as perfective and as contributing to the general good or beatitude of the person. Thus upon their being apprehended, there spontaneously arises in the will an approving stance, either joy if the good is present or desire if it is absent. For example, when someone becomes aware of one's own ignorance of some point of knowledge, he or she spontaneously desires to have that knowledge. This does not necessarily mean that one will actively seek to acquire the knowledge, but only that there is a spontaneous motion of the will toward it that is not an act of *free-will*. Second, any good that is good for the person as a whole and seen as such will be naturally willed. Thomas gives as examples existing and living. Another might be something like health, which is not the object of a particular power but a condition of well-being for the person as a whole. These too are spontaneously approved by the will either by an act of joy if it is present or desire if it is absent.

One way to express the natural quality of this motion is to say that it is not an act of *free-will*, that is, the will does not move in these

cases because it has chosen to do so. These things are willed naturally in the sense that the will spontaneously moves toward them upon their being apprehended. So long as a thing is seen to pertain to one's beatitude or one's perfection, there will be a movement of the will toward it (IIIa q. 18, aa. 3–6). The necessity of this movement has to do with the connection a good has with beatitude. If the good is seen to be necessary for beatitude (for example, existing), then it will be willed necessarily. Nonetheless, the kind of necessity with which such goods are willed is not the same as the necessity with which beatitude is willed. Beatitude is necessarily or absolutely willed because it belongs to the very structure of the will; the desire arises immediately from the very nature of the will. These other goods, by contrast, are willed on the basis of the prior willing of the end, beatitude. Their necessity is, in Thomas's language, the "necessity of the end" (*necessitas finis*), the kind of necessity a thing has when it is a means without which an end cannot be achieved. If the end is desired, it is necessary that this means be desired. And so here, since beatitude is necessarily willed, whatever is seen as required for beatitude will be willed with the necessity of the end (Ia, q. 82, a. 1).

Does it then follow that all such objects are necessarily pursued by the willer? This is not the case. In order to see why, I will discuss the various acts of the will. Having clarified these according to Thomas's descriptions, I will be in a position to explain more completely the natural willing of particular goods.

THE ACTS OF THE WILL

For Thomas, a person does not achieve beatitude by a single act; consequently the moral life consists of many acts of the will together with the external acts arising from them. With God and the angels, it is otherwise. For God, beatitude is identical with essence and no further actualization of a potency, that is, no operation is required in order to attain beatitude. For the angels, on the other hand, just one act is required in which the angel's will is suitably disposed toward beatitude. For human beings, however, many acts over a period of time are required (Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 7). Moreover, these acts differ not only numerically but also in kind. In the *Prima secundae*, qq. 8–17, Thomas presents a very highly developed theory of the various kinds of will-acts, an understanding of which is necessary if one is to grasp his picture of the moral life. All these acts, as acts of the will, are appetitive motions of the person as a whole; they are the strivings, aversions, rests, and so on of the person. It is precisely through these appetitive motions, especially those that are free, that each person determines himself with respect to goods and evils.

There are many distinctions to be drawn among these acts of the will. The most prominent in Thomas's treatment is that between acts ordered to ends (*simple willing*, *intention*, and *enjoyment*) and those ordered to means (*choice*, *consent*, and *use*).[24] There is, in addition, a distinction between the acts that are deliberate and free, arising from *free-will*, and those that are natural or spontaneous and not the result of deliberate choice (IIIa, q. 18, aa. 3–6). There is also a distinction between acts of the will directed to goods not yet possessed and acts directed to possessed goods. This distinction should not be overlooked, for it means that "willing" refers not just to acts directed to the acquisition or achievement of goods or bringing about states of affairs that do not yet obtain, but also rejoicing in goods or being sad about evils.[25] Finally, some of the acts occur in what Thomas calls the order of intention, the affective tending toward goods in which ends precede means, while others occur in the order of execution, the willing of the exterior acts by which the desired good is actually achieved or possessed wherein means precede ends (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 16, a. 4).

Aquinas's understanding of the will-acts is not properly seen by taking isolated acts of the will, but rather by seeing each act in its relation to several other acts. In general, Aquinas sees the relationships of these several acts of the will as parallel to the relationship among their objects. Those objects, goods of one kind or another (or evils to be avoided), are related to one another as means and ends. These means and ends are grouped together into what I will call "chains" of ends; lower links of the chain are goods sought as means for the sake of higher links, which in their turn are sought as means to yet higher ends (Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 2). If we start at a given point on the chain we can go "up" the chain toward

some end sought for its own sake or "down" the chain toward goods sought only as means to other ends. In neither direction is it possible to proceed to infinity (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4).

Suppose, for example, that a woman learns that her elderly mother in Chicago has become ill and needs to be looked after. The woman decides (chooses) to go and help her mother recover. What end is she pursuing? By virtue of the love of friendship she has for her mother, she considers her mother to be another self, and, consequentially, she considers her mother's welfare to be part of her own (Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 2). Thus, her own good or beatitude includes the health and general well-being of her mother. On Aquinas's view, then, she may have a yet further end. She may love her mother with supernatural charity and so love her mother as ordered to God who is then the ultimate end loved by the woman. This is Aquinas's doctrine that all human friendships can be ordered to the love of charity (IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 7). The woman loves God as the ultimate end in which her beatitude is to be found. These situations represent the "higher" links of the chain, all of which concern beatitude, the ultimate end.

If we go downwards from the decision to go to Chicago, the woman must decide what form of transportation to take. Supposing she decides to fly, she must now choose an airline; to do this, she must call her travel agent; for this, she must find the telephone number and then actually make the call. At each step the person deliberates about what is necessary to achieve the good and then chooses the appropriate means until reaching the point at which exterior action is possible. Up to this point all the willing occurs in the order of intention. Once this point is reached, however, the person begins to execute the choices that have been made (Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 4).

We should also note that in fact there are many other chains descending from the choice to go to Chicago. The woman may have to prepare many things for her family (another set of persons she loves with love of friendship) to provide for her absence; she will have to pack her luggage with all the choices that entails; she will have to make her way to the airport, requiring yet another chain of means and ends. Each person is always caught up in any number of such chains, so that at times the same act may serve as a means to more than one end or what serves one end may hinder another (Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 3). It is in this larger context that a person chooses the various means and ends. Aquinas, however, in treating the different acts of the will (and in generally analyzing moral action) tends to simplify matters, and, for the sake of analytic clarity, often looks at choices or other acts of the will without describing the whole context in which they take place. It is always important to keep this fact in mind, for otherwise there is a danger of taking Aquinas's teaching too abstractly.

At the heart of Thomas's scheme lies the act of choice. From the moral point of view, the most significant acts are those in which the will, taken as *free-will*, exercises dominion over its own act. Such acts are proper to the will *as will* (q. 10, a. 1, ad 1). Thomas also says that what one wills in the mode of *free-will* one wills *simpliciter* (IIIa, q. 21, a. 4). Choice, as the act of *free-will*, is the most significant act from the moral point of view, and, as such, it is the first act to consider.

Choice (*Electio*)

Choice, as we have seen, has the following structure. A person must determine himself to one of two (or more) possible actions. He so determines himself in the light of some end for the sake of which one or the other of the prospective actions is chosen (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3). Following Aristotle, Thomas maintains that the object of choice is always some possible action. It is possible or at least taken as possible, for no one chooses what one knows to be impossible (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 5). It is an action (an *agibile*) for whenever one chooses something other than an action, one is in fact choosing to have or to use that thing by means of an action (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 4). So, for example, if one chooses to eat apples instead of oranges, one is choosing the eating of the former over the eating of the latter; if one chooses a car, one is choosing to drive that car; if one votes for an individual or body to exercise authority, one is choosing to obey that person or body.

The chosen action is, as I have said, a means to an end. That end is, first, the good immediately above it on the chain of means and

ends, but it also includes all ends up to and including beatitude. At any given stage on the chain, the means needed to achieve the higher stages are chosen. But if these means themselves require some other means for their achievement, then a further choice at the next lower level is required. This series of choices proceeds until a point is reached at which all the means are decided upon and only execution is required. Therefore, choice occurs anytime the means to achieve an end (ultimate or mediate) are not yet fixed. In order to fix these means, there is, prior to each choice, a deliberation, a process of thinking about the possible means and judging their relative advantages and disadvantages (Ia IIae, q. 14).

At each point on the chain, a person is determining him or herself, and, with each choice, the person becomes affectively committed to some good. This commitment to a good occurs in the order of intention, which is distinct from the order of execution. These two orders work in different directions. In the order of intention, what is first is the last end, and the higher an end is on the chain of ends, the more priority it has. In the order of execution, by contrast, what is lower is what is first accomplished and only at the end of the activity is the ultimate goal achieved. An important consequence of this distinction between the two orders is that, in temporal terms, a choice is very often made quite some time before it is finally executed. The woman makes the choice to go to Chicago several days before she actually goes. This does not mean that the choice is not real; it simply means that a person can determine oneself to an action long before actually carrying it out (for example, scheduling a doctor's appointment). The gap between making a choice and executing the action chosen does allow that a person can retract a choice before (or even while) carrying it out. This occurs whenever a person ceases to will the previously willed action.

Intention (*Intentio*)

Unlike choice, intention is directed to ends and not to means. It is, however, intimately linked to choice, for wherever there is choice there is also intention. The reason for this is that, in any choice, there is a concomitant willing of the end. And in this case, the end is being willed precisely as that which is to be achieved by the chosen means. This is exactly how Thomas defines intention: the act of the will directed to an end taken as the terminus of the means ordered to it (Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3). So, to return to the earlier example, in buying her ticket, the woman is intending to go to Chicago.

If one thinks of the chain of means and ends, it should be clear that at any link in the chain, all the goods above it are intended. When the woman buys her ticket, she is intending not just to go to Chicago, but also to care for her mother, to have her mother once again healthy, and ultimately her happiness. It should also be clear that any given link, while itself a chosen act, becomes an intended end with respect to the further choices made in order to achieve it. If one considers the choice to call the travel agent, buying the ticket now becomes the intended end. So, the notions of end and means and the corresponding notions of intention and choice are fluid; the willing of an action is a choice when seen in relation to what is above it, but is an intention when seen in relation to what is below it. In this case, there are not two distinct acts of willing to buy the ticket; rather, there is only one act, but it is viewed from different angles (q. 12, a. 2).

It should also be clear that acts of intention are the result of a choice. It is because the woman chooses to buy the ticket that buying the ticket becomes the intended end of her choice to call the travel agent. And this is how it normally occurs in one's voluntary actions: one chooses some action and then proceeds to choose means to accomplish it. It is only the ultimate end, beatitude in general, that is intended without having first been chosen. As I have shown, all other goods, including the specific instantiation of beatitude that a person takes as his own, must be chosen. Once again, then, the centrality of the act of choice is clear. Save for beatitude in general, the intending of any goal or end is the consequence of a free choice, and for this reason, intention is usually an exercise of *free-will* and an essential part of the moral action for which a person is held responsible.[26]

As a final point with respect to intention, I should note that intentions can be of various durations—at times, of quite long duration. For example, a student who decides to earn a

bachelor's degree intends that end for at least four years, making during that time a multitude of choices toward that end. During that period, however, the person is only occasionally thinking explicitly about the bachelor's degree. Nevertheless, the person is intending that goal throughout the whole time; the intention of that end is animating much if not all that the person does. For this reason, Thomas distinguishes between actually willing an end and intending the end habitually (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3). This distinction is important, for it allows one to recognize that intentions can persist for long periods of time (for example, fidelity to one's spouse); it also demonstrates how it is possible that a person, while willing only one thing at a time actually, can have many simultaneous willings. All the choices that a person makes and which have not been completely executed exist in the willer in the habitual form. Here again, one encounters a complexity in the life of the will that Thomas usually leaves aside for the sake of analytic simplicity.

Simple Willing (*Simplex voluntas*)

A second act of the will that is directed to the end is what Thomas calls "will" or "willing" (*voluntas* or *velle*). As he points out, the word *voluntas* refers both to the power of the will and to a specific act of the will, the act which he refers to as "simple willing." A power, Thomas says, receives its name from its most proper act, and that act is the one directed to the power's most proper object. Now the object of the will is the good, and, the means being good only by their relation to the end, the end has more the character of good than the means. The act called "will" is therefore that of simply willing the end (Ia IIae, q. 8, a. 2).[27]

How is this act different from the act of intention? The difference lies in the fact that intention is not "simple." Intention is not directed to the end *simply*, but rather to the end *as that which will be achieved by means*. Or, expressed less formally, in intending an end a person is committed to actually carrying out the actions needed to achieve that end. Simple willing, on the other hand, is simply the willing of some good as perfective of me (or those united to me by love) without any necessary reference to whether I intend actually to acquire that good. To take an example, for years I may want—taken as something that would be good for me—to go see Paris. During those years, I never do anything about actually going there. This is simple willing. But suppose that I finally decide actually to go; I am now *ipso facto* committed to employing all the means necessary for this trip. At this point, I *intend* to go to Paris. Clearly, simple willing precedes intention, since one would not intend an end if one did not first have this simple desire to possess it. But at the same time, to will an end by intending it signifies a much greater personal commitment; a person who intends an end is personally committed to its achievement. This is not the case with simple willings (Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4).[28]

The simple willings include the spontaneous, natural willings I described earlier in speaking of the will's natural acts. These willings, as we saw, are directed first to beatitude and second to all the other things which a person spontaneously grasps as suitable (*conveniens*) to his nature and thereby contributing to beatitude.[29] A spontaneous willing arises upon the apprehension of some suitable good; hence, to say that a simple willing is natural does not mean that all persons have it nor that a given person always has it. For example, according to Thomas, parents naturally love their children—have a desire for what is good for them—while children naturally love their parents (IIa IIae, q. 26, a 9). However, before being parents they clearly do *not* experience this natural desire for the well-being of their children; nor is everyone a parent. Similarly, Thomas speaks of a natural love for God, but also recognizes that a person does not have such a love until she or he has some knowledge of God. Thus, an instance of a person who does not know or love God does not invalidate his theory of a natural love for God.[30] It seems also that when Thomas speaks of natural inclinations, as he does in the well-known text on the precepts of the natural law (Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2), these inclinations fit into the category of natural willings. They are not merely movements of the sense appetite (for example, the desire for truth), nor are they the result of deliberate choice; rather, they arise spontaneously. This

seems to be exactly what Thomas understands by simple willings.

In contrast to intention, a person need not act on his simple willings. That is to say, many simple willings remain nothing more than that and are never transformed into intentions. To use one of Thomas's examples, a person has a natural revulsion to having a wound cauterized, yet for the sake of health wills the operation nonetheless. This revulsion is not merely a motion of the sense appetite, but also occurs at the level of will. The person, however, does not act upon his will to flee the pain but rather intends the good of health (IIIa, q. 18, a. 5).[31] An unintended simple willing such as this is called at times by Thomas a "velleity" (*velleitas*) (IIIa, q. 21, a. 4). It is important to note the existence of these velleities, for they help to explain questions that seem difficult for Thomas's understanding of the will. For example, at times it seems difficult to understand how a person can act against a natural act of the will. How, for example, can a person commit suicide if there is a natural willing of life? The answer lies in recognizing that the natural willing is an act of simple willing and that such an act is not the same as intention. In suicide, the person stops intending to live. It does not seem, however, that the person ceases willing to live altogether, as is evidenced in the interior resistance to their action that such people experience. So too, when Thomas claims that rational beings naturally love God more than self, this does not mean that sin is impossible. The notion of velleity also helps to explain how a person can be tempted—experience an attraction at the level of will toward an evil—and yet not follow that temptation.[32]

Finally, note that, according to Thomas, what a person is said to will simply (*simpliciter*) is not what one wills by the act of simple willing, but rather what one wills by an act of *free-will*. Precisely as spontaneous and natural, simple willings do not involve the degree of self-determination that is found in choice and intention. To have a simple willing is not to commit oneself to action, whereas both intention and choice do necessarily involve such a commitment. Thomas distinguishes between will as producing natural acts (*voluntas ut natura*) and will as producing acts by means of rational deliberation and in the power of the one acting (*voluntas ut ratio*). It is only in this latter mode that a person is said to will simply; what is willed in the mode of nature is willed only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*). Consequently, while *free-will* depends upon the will in the mode of nature, the acts of the will that are the most significant for the moral life are those of *free-will* (IIIa, q. 21, a. 4).[33]

Consent (Consensus)

The act of consent, on Aquinas's account, is very close to choice, indeed at times they are identical. Consent names the "application of the appetitive motion to something preexisting in the power of the one applying it" (Ia IIae, q. 15, a. 3).[34] To consent to something is, like choice, to be affectively related to that thing as something actually to be done. Hence, like choice, consent has to do with means to the end, is directed to what is possible, and follows upon deliberation. Also, like choice, consent is an act of *free-will*, an act in the control of the agent (ibid.). If, out of several possible means to the intended end, only one appears to be suitable, then, says Thomas, consent and choice are one and the same act. To choose that means over the non-suitable ones and to apply the appetitive motion to it are the same act.

At times, however, the two acts are not wholly identical. This occurs when more than one means is suitable. It may happen that the woman in my example could either fly or take a train to Chicago, and that either possibility is agreeable, and even that each has its own advantages. It would be possible here to consent to both as acceptable possibilities, but then a further act of choice would be required by which she would decide upon one as preferable to the other. In this case, the acts of consent and choice would not be identical, and only with the act of choice would the previous act of consent actually yield the action. Choice, then, always implies consent, but consent need not imply choice.[35] What is important for the moral life is the fact of self-determination with regard to the means to one's beatitude, and Thomas sometimes refers to this self-determination to action as consent and at other times as choice.

Use (*Usus*)

Use is the connection between the act of choice and the execution of the chosen action. Simple willing, intention, consent, and choice all occur in the order of intention. By all of these acts the agent becomes affectively ordered to various goods; these acts occur within the agent and make the agent be appetitively oriented to the various goods. Choice is the last act in this order, for by choice a person is committed to pursuing or rejecting some good. The choice, however, must be executed. For example, having chosen to go to Chicago, to fly, and to use a travel agent, there is no need for further choices; rather, only execution is necessary—the woman must pick up the phone and call the agent. Thus, a further act of the will beyond choice is required, one that is found in the order of execution, the order of realizing the action (Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 4). The choice having been made and the time for action having arrived (these are not always simultaneous), other powers of the soul and the body must move in order to perform the action. These motions are not instinctual, but, rather, they are guided by reason and will. It is precisely the willing involved here that receives the name "use," for the will uses or exercises the other powers in order to carry out the chosen action. As discussed in the context of treating the exercise and specification of the will's own act, the will can command or exercise the acts of other powers; precisely when it does this, its act is use (Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 1).

As an act of the will (rational appetite), use necessarily follows upon an act of reason. Thomas gives this act of reason a special name, "command" (*imperium*) (Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 1). Command and use are a pair, command naming the rational component and use the volitional component of the voluntary act by which a power is exercised. If a person walks in a rational way (for example, not sleepwalking), then Thomas would say that there is both an act of command, since the walking is being commanded by reason, and an act of use, since the will is exercising the motive power. There is, however, only one act here, called command when seen from the side of reason and called use when seen from the side of will (Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 3). So the sequence as Thomas describes it is that a choice is made, there is then a command to exercise the appropriate powers for the carrying out of the chosen action, and this command governs—gives formal determination to—the act of use. Ultimately there is the exterior act, such as walking, the act of the other, commanded powers.[36]

Enjoyment (*Fruitio*)

Enjoyment is the act of the will which a person has upon possessing or acquiring a desired end, for example, the joy of the woman upon her mother's recovery of health or even upon the securing of the airplane ticket. Enjoyment occurs at the end of the execution of the action, when the desired good has been made present (Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 1). As Thomas states, "Enjoyment seems to belong to the love or delight which a person has for the last thing he hoped for, that is, the end" (ibid.).[37] This act of the will should be seen in the light of Thomas's larger understanding of the affections of the will. The first of these affections is love, which is directed to a good simply. If the good is absent and not yet possessed there arises the further affection of desire; if the good is possessed there is delight or joy (Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2).[38] Enjoyment is the joy which is produced in the will when the will's object, the good, is actually possessed.

Enjoyment in the fullest sense occurs with the real possession of the ultimate end (Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 3). Thomas points to two ways in which enjoyment can be imperfect. First, the good can be imperfectly possessed as occurs when the good is not possessed in reality but only in intention, as desired (Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 4). This would be the kind of enjoyment associated with hope. Second, the good desired may be not the final end, but only some good that is a means to the end. Such a good, when possessed, gives rise to enjoyment, but not enjoyment in the most perfect sense. Perfect enjoyment occurs when the final end is really possessed. Obviously for Thomas enjoyment in the fullest sense will occur only with the possession of the last end, God, in the next life (Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 3).

LOVE AS THE FIRST AFFECTION OF THE WILL

In order to complete the Thomistic account of the will's role in the moral life, it is necessary to touch briefly on Thomas's doctrine concerning love (*amor*), especially the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*), which is the first of all the will's affections and the basis for all its acts. This teaching provides the wider context for understanding the will's various acts as described in Ia IIae, qq. 6–17 and also allows us to see that for Thomas the moral life is essentially a matter of relationships among persons.

Thomas teaches, first, that the primary affection of the appetitive powers, both sense and rational, is love. Love denotes an appetite's most basic relationship to the good; it denotes the fundamental suitability of a being to that which constitutes its good. Thomas refers to love as the proportion (*proportio*) that exists between a being and its good, speaking, for example, of the suitability or proportion of a heavy object to the middle of the earth as love (Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 2). On the basis of such a proportion or suitability, there arise two other affections in the appetite: desire (*desiderium*), when the loved good is not yet possessed, and delight or joy (*delectatio/gaudium*) if the good is possessed. All further appetitive motions toward goods such as hope or fear arise on the basis of desire; all motions toward evils (fear, anger, etc.) arise from hate (*odium*), which in turn is derived from love.[39] The consequence of this doctrine is immediately evident: all motions of the appetitive powers are based on the first and most basic affection of love. In an article asking whether agents do all that they do from love, Thomas states: "I reply that every agent acts for an end. . . . The end however is the good which is loved and desired by each thing. Hence it is clear that every agent, whatever it may be, carries out every action from some love" (Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 6).[40]

Second, Thomas distinguishes love at the rational level by referring to it as "dilection" (*dilectio*) (Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 3). Moreover, he points to a determinate structure found in all dilection, that is, in every love of every will. This structure is expressed by the distinction between love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) and love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*). At the rational level—the level of will—love always takes the form of wanting a good for someone; as Thomas often states, appealing to Aristotle, "to love is to will the good for someone."[41] Accordingly dilection always has two objects, the person who is loved and the good which is wanted for that person. The will's motion toward the person who is loved is called love of friendship, while the motion directed to the good(s) willed for that person is called love of concupiscence. Formally speaking, by love of friendship a person is loved as that for whom good is sought; by love of concupiscence something is loved as being good for some person (Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 4). The person loved can be oneself or another person, and the thing willed for the person can be bodily goods such as food or drink or spiritual goods such as honor or knowledge or even virtues. For Thomas, these two loves are always found together and indeed constitute a single act: one does not love someone without wanting what is good for that person, nor does one love goods that are not persons without loving them for some person.[42]

Third, within dilection, love of friendship is more basic than love of concupiscence, for one only wants the good for someone if one first loves that person. Hence, Thomas says that love of friendship is love in the most perfect sense—and even speaks of love of friendship as "including" love of concupiscence.[43] Love of friendship, then, is the will's most basic affection; all motion of the will begins with and is based on the love of a person. Even the will's natural inclination toward beatitude is described by Thomas as a self-love. Each person naturally loves himself (a love of friendship), and so he naturally wants what is the greatest for himself, in other words, desires his beatitude (Ia, q. 60, a. 3).

What are the implications of saying that love of friendship is the will's primary affection or motion? It means, first, that the affection of the will which is the most basic of all and is the source of all others is precisely *love for persons*. Everything other than persons is willed for persons and only persons are willed as being good in themselves. Everything in the universe that is not a person, including even the accidental perfections of persons such as health or virtue, is willed for the persons in which it is found. As Thomas

succinctly states it, "The principal ends of human acts are God, self, and others, since we do whatever we do for the sake of one of these" (Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9, c.).[44] This view of love mirrors Thomas's understanding of the universe as a whole according to which only rational beings—persons—exist for their own sake; all other created beings exist for the sake of rational beings and find their fulfillment in their service to those rational beings.[45] Thus Thomas's moral universe is, in a certain sense, much like Kant's kingdom of ends. The moral life consists primarily in loving persons: loving the right persons in the proper order (*ordo amoris*), and loving the proper goods for those persons.[46]

Second, this doctrine means that in all acts of the will, especially in all acts of choice, what is being chosen is some good for some person(s). While one might speak at times of willing something such as food or knowledge or "state of affairs" (in the sense that, by one's choices, one can bring about a condition that did not previously obtain), the basic structure of willing is always that of willing some good(s) for some person(s). This basic structure is to be found in all the will's acts: in the act of enjoyment, one rejoices in the fact that some person has some good; when one intends an end, one is intending some good for some person; and, even in simple willing, some good is being willed for some person. While the object of the will in general is the good, and while one can also make such formal distinctions among objects as that between means and ends, one can also make a more material distinction among the objects. This is the case when one distinguishes between the persons for whom one wills goods and the goods one wills for those persons. Every object of the will fits into one of these categories. Hence, should one ask what a person wills, materially speaking, we must answer that a person wills, first, oneself and other persons (taking them as part of his or her own self by means of the love of friendship) and wills, second, all the goods of those persons along with the means for achieving those goods.

Finally, this understanding of the love of friendship—the affective affirmation of a person—as the most fundamental motion of the will helps in understanding why Thomas's teaching on the will's natural inclination to beatitude is not an egotistical one. According to Thomas's teaching, each person has a natural inclination in his will toward his own good, the possession of which constitutes his beatitude. This natural inclination is, as was said above, a love of friendship for oneself with a love of concupiscence for the perfecting good. Aquinas's doctrine concerning the love of friendship shows how one can take the good of another person as one's own good; thus, it opens up the possibility that one's perfection can be found outside oneself in another person, especially in God.[47] According to Thomas, it belongs essentially to the love of friendship to take as one's own good the good of the beloved. Thus, one's own good can be expanded, so to speak, when one has a love of friendship for another person. One loves one's own good precisely in loving the good of the other person for that person's sake (Ia IIae, q. 28, aa. 2–3). This happens especially in the case of loving God. If a person loves God with the love of friendship (*caritas*) then the good of God becomes his own good and his beatitude consists in possessing (by the *visio beatifica*) this good (IIa IIae, q. 180, a. 1). The will's natural inclination to beatitude does not lock a person inside himself; rather, it draws him out of himself and into the possession of a larger good, which, through the love of friendship, has become his own.

Notes

[1]"et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem."

[2]*In I Ethicorum*, lect. 1: "Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis; nam, si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur quae non subiacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur propriae humanae sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur subiectum philosophiae naturalis est motus vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem" (Leonine, 4, 39–49).

[3]"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam: quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum." Cf. *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 7, in contrarium: "hoc enim est proprium voluntati in quantum est voluntas, quod sit domina suorum actuum" (Leonine, 626, 372–74); also *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 3, c.: "Voluntas, inquantum voluntas, cum sit libera, ad utrumlibet se habet" (Marietti, 30).

[4]On Thomas's use of the term *liberum arbitrium*, see also *In II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet, 595–98); *De veritate*, q. 24, aa. 4, 6 (Leonine, 689–92; 694–96). The voluntariness in question here is what Thomas calls the "perfect voluntary" (*voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam*), the sort of voluntariness proper to free actions. This is contrasted with imperfect voluntariness, the sort of voluntariness found in brute animals, the sort of voluntariness, I might add, that one finds Aristotle describing (*Eth. Nic.* 3.1–2 [1109b30–1112a17]). For this distinction in Thomas, see ST Ia IIae, q. 6, aa. 1–2.

[5]It is important to note that Thomas uses "appetite" (*appetitus*) to designate both the tending or desiring and the power by which such tending or desiring arises.

[6]See *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 2 (Leonine, 684–87); SCG II, chaps. 47–48.

[7]"Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.—Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscant aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum; non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent; neque in bonum particulariter tantum, sicut ea in quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio; sed quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas. Unde, cum angeli per intellectum cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni, manifestum est quod in eis sit voluntas."

[8]See *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 3: "intellectus enim etsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat" (Leonine, 624, 238–241).

[9]For this point, see esp. *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 1 (Leonine, 727–30).

[10]"Et hoc ideo est quia, cum bonum simpliciter consistat in actu, et non in potentia, ultimus autem actus est operatio, vel usus quarumcumque rerum habitarum; bonum hominis simpliciter consideratur in bona operatione, vel bono usu rerum habitarum. Utimur autem rebus omnibus per voluntatem. Unde ex bona voluntate, qua homo bene utitur rebus habitis, dicitur homo bonus; et ex mala, malus." See also *De malo*, q. 1, a. 5 (Leonine, 21–26).

[11]*De malo*, q. 6, a. un.: "Si enim non sit liberum aliquid in nobis, sed ex necessitate movemur ad volendum tollitur deliberatio, exhortatio, praeceptum et punitio, et laus et vituperium circa que moralis Philosophia consistit. Huiusmodi autem opiniones que destruunt principia alicuius partis philosophie dicuntur positiones extranee, sicut nichil moveri quod destruit principia scientie naturalis" (Leonine, 148, 256–63). See *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 1 (Leonine, 677–84); ST Ia, q. 83, a. 1.

[12]*De malo*, q. 6, a. un.: "Hec autem opinio est heretica. Tollit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in humanis actibus: non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit quod vitare non possit. Est etiam annumeranda inter extraneas philosophie opiniones, quia non solum contrariatur fidei, set subvertit omnia principia philosophie moralis" (Leonine, 148, 248–56). Another such "extraneous opinion" named by Thomas is the view that there is no such thing as motion, a view that denies the possibility of physics by denying its subject matter, mobile being. These views are not dealt with by the science in question, since such sciences presuppose their subject matter and go on to demonstrate the properties of it. Rather, the science which deals with extraneous opinions is metaphysics, for it falls to metaphysics to defend the first principles of all the sciences (see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 8). Therefore, it is understandable that Thomas does not defend the existence of free acts within his moral treatises.

[13]For this point, see also the following texts: *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 7 (Leonine, 629–30); ST Ia IIae, q. 1, aa. 5–8; q. 2, aa. 7–8; q. 5, a. 8; q. 10, a. 2; *De malo*, q. 6, a. un. (Leonine, 145–53). As a representative text, ST Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 8: "sic necesse est quod omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum. . . . Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur."

[14]*De veritate*, q. 22, a. 7: "Aliis enim rebus inditus est naturalis appetitus alicuius rei determinatae, sicut gravi quod sit deorsum, et unicuique etiam animali id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam; sed homini inditus est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetat naturaliter

se esse completum in bonitate. Sed in quo ista completio consistat, utrum in virtutibus vel scientiis vel delectationibus vel huiusmodi aliis, non est ei determinatum a natura" (Leonine, 630, 50–60). See also ad 6.

[15]"quia omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis . . ."

[16]*De malo*, q. 6, a. un.: "set forma intellecta est universalis, sub qua multa possunt comprehendi. Unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa; sicut si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali, sub qua comprehenduntur diverse figure domus, potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam vel alterius figure" (Leonine, 148, 287–96).

[17]*De veritate*, q. 25, a. 1 (Leonine, 727–30).

[18]On this point see also *De veritate*, q. 22, aa. 5–6 (Leonine, 621–29); ST Ia, q. 60, a, 2; q. 82, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 10, aa. 1–2; *De malo*, q. 6, a. un. (Leonine, 145–53).

[19]The treatment of the freedom of the will's acts in terms of exercise and specification is to be found in Thomas's later works, especially in the *Prima secundae* and in q. 6 of *De malo*. Some commentators have seen the introduction of this distinction as a response to the condemnation of certain propositions in Paris in 1270, maintaining that Thomas wished to emphasize the will's freedom and self-motion. For discussion of these problems see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Ducolot, 1957), 207–16, 225–43. O.-H. Pesch, "Philosophie und Theologie der Freiheit bei Thomas von Aquin in quaest. disp. 6 De malo," *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift* 13 (1962): 1–25; and H. M. Manteau-Bonamy, "La liberté de l'homme selon Thomas d'Aquin (la datation de la Q. Disp. De Malo)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 46 (1979): 7–34, have argued that Thomas's response to the condemnations accentuated a movement to be found throughout his career toward a more "voluntaristic" understanding of choice.

[20]This point underlies the principle that the moral goodness of the will depends upon how the will's object is presented to it by the intellect, a principle that is central to Thomas's discussions of the morality of acting on an erroneous conscience (ST Ia IIae, q. 19, aa. 2–6).

[21]I should note that in cases of non-necessary truths—contingent truths—the will plays a role not only in consideration but also in the assent or withholding of assent. This role of the will is highlighted in Thomas's discussion of the act of faith which is not made on the basis of natural evidence, but by an act of the will under the influence of grace (IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2).

[22]This is what happens whenever a person avoids having to make a choice simply by refusing to think about whatever the matter might be.

[23]"Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus: et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis: ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis sicut quaedam particularia bona."

[24]The Latin terms are respectively, *voluntas*, *intentio*, and *fruitio* (directed to ends) and *electio*, *consensus*, and *usus* (directed toward means). I shall generally use the English equivalents.

[25]The act of enjoyment is directed to the possessed good; all others are directed to goods or evils not yet possessed. Sins such as *delectatio morosa* (ST Ia IIae, q. 74, aa. 6–8), envy (IIa IIae, q. 36), or jealousy are instances of morally significant enjoyments and sadnesses.

[26]In considering the factors that affect the morality of an action, Thomas lays special weight on the object and the end (ST Ia IIae, q. 18, aa. 5–7) which are the objects respectively of choice and intention. Thus, in evaluating the morality of a given action, the most important acts of the will are the choice and the intention, both being acts of *free-will*. These two acts, says Thomas, constitute a single willing, although one can always distinguish them on the basis of the distinction in their objects (Ia IIae, q. 12, a. 4).

[27]For Thomas's use of the term *simplex voluntas*, see ST IIIa, q. 18, a. 4; q. 21, a. 4. In *De veritate*, Thomas refers to this act under the name of *simplex velle*; see q. 22, aa. 13–14 (Leonine, 643–48).

[28]"Ad quartum dicendum quod intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute: sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur: et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur: et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam: sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire." See also *De veritate*, q. 22, aa. 13–15 (Leonine, 643–49).

[29]See n. 22 above.

[30]*In III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3, ad 3 (Moos, 930). For Thomas's arguments for a natural love of God, see *In III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3 (Moos, 927–30); ST Ia, q. 60, a. 5; Ia IIae, q.109, a. 3; IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 3. Two examples Thomas gives of spontaneous willings arising are those of a person willing to be warm when cold (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 5, ad 2) and of a person naturally being repelled when having a wound cauterized (IIIa, q. 18, a. 5). The latter, being a negative willing by which one tends away from an evil, can be called a *noluntas* (Ia IIae, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1).

[31]"Similiter voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamen quandoque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem: sicut etiam in aliquo puro homine sensualitas eius, et etiam voluntas absolute considerata, refugit ustionem, quam voluntas secundum rationem elegit propter finem sanitatis."

[32]When one considers Thomas's understanding of *akrasia* (*incontinentia*), in which there are two ends to which a person is attracted (pleasure versus obedience to the divine law, for example), it seems clear that the willing of the end for which the person does not act is a real willing but does not attain the level of *intentio*. In short, the notions of *voluntas* and *velleitas* help to understand all the cases in which there seems to be a conflict within a person's own will. The notion is also important for Thomas's explanation of how a person can legitimately will what God does not will (ST Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 10; IIIa, q. 18, aa. 5–6; q. 21, aa. 2, 4).

[33]"Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis est voluntas rationis: hoc enim absolute volumus quod secundum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autem quod volumus secundum motum sensualitatem, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, quae consideratur ut natura, non simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid: scilicet, si aliud non obsistat quod per deliberationem rationis invenitur."

[34]"consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis."

[35]Aquinas maintains, moreover, that even when the two acts are identical, they still remain distinct in terms of their intelligibilities (*rationes*). When the will's act is taken as consent it is being understood as simply a being-pleased with the action as an acceptable action; when the will's act is taken as choice the action is taken as an action to be done in preference to other actions not to be done (ST Ia IIae, q. 15., a. 3).

[36]Thomas defines command (*imperium*) as an act of reason presupposing an act of the will (ST Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 1). What he has in mind is an act of the will prior to the command by which that command gets its moving force (reason alone does not move anything), and not the act of the will governed by the command, that is, not the act of use. The act of the will that is presupposed by command, then, would normally be choice, for the command to exercise the other power has moving force only if the person has already chosen to carry out that act. Thomas does mention the possibility that command and use precede choice. What he has in mind is that in the deliberation that precedes choice the intellect is exercised in a voluntary way and hence there must be acts of command and use, acts which obviously precede the choice. In this case the willing that is prior to command would be the willing of the end, for it is the desire for the end that moves a person to deliberate about the means (q. 17, a. 3, ad 1).

[37]"Unde fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis."

[38]"Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. . . . Delectatio enim est fruitio boni . . ."

[39]Hope and despair are affections of the irascible appetite with respect to desired goods whose acquisition presents an aspect of difficulty. Therefore, any good that is hoped for or despaired of is already desired and hence loved (ST Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 1). Hate (*odium*) presupposes love because evil is a privation of a good and so one hates a privation only if one first loves the good that the privation diminishes or destroys, as a person would hate sickness because he first loves health (q. 25, a. 2).

[40]ST Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2: "Respondeo dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore." Also ad 2: "Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa." Cf. Ia, q. 20, a. 1.

[41]Arist. *Rh.* 2.4 (1380b35): "Amare est velle alicui bonum."

[42]For Thomas's doctrine on *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*, see also Ia, q. 60, a. 3; IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 1; q. 25, a. 2; *In div. nom.*, chap. 4, lect. 9, n. 405.

[43]*In div. nom.*, chap. 4, lect. 10, nn. 404–5.

[44]This quotation appears within the discussion of how the gravity of a sin depends upon the person whom it offends: "Respondeo dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. Fines autem

principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et proximus: quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus; quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur."

[45]For this doctrine in Aquinas, see esp. SCG III, chaps. 22, 112.

[46]The similarity to Kant's kingdom of ends lies primarily in the fact that the moral life is a matter of treating persons properly, which means as ends in themselves and not as ordered to some other (created) being. All other beings enter the moral life by way of their relation to persons (ST IIa IIae, q. 58, a. 3, ad 3). Thomas does not, however, share Kant's view of the autonomy of these ends such that each is the source of moral law. For Thomas, God is the primary source of law and all other persons have rectitude of will—moral rectitude—by obeying that law.

[47]*In III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3 (Moos, 927–30); also ST Ia, q. 60, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 3.

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