

s vel culpae, in quibus idem est
t culpa.”
1, a. 3, ad 2: “ipse etiam, inquan-
clicet communitatis, cuius est
d vel demeretur, in quantum ac-
ale disponit.”
21, a. 4, ad 3: “Sed totum quod
otest et habet, ordinandum est
omnis actus hominis bonus vel
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The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq. 22–48)

Kevin White

The theme of the “passions of the soul” invites reflection both because of its moral and practical urgency and because of its vivid contribution to theoretical consideration of human nature. Analogously, Aquinas’s unprecedentedly elaborate “treatise” on the passions is of interest both for its part in the great argument of the *Summa theologiae*, where it is subordinated to the goal of clarifying the action by which the rational creature finds happiness in a return to its Creator and Exemplar, and for its own absorbing argument and detail, which make it a precursor of early modern philosophical treatises on the passions that had other aims.¹ In his youthful *Sentences* commentary and *De veritate*, Aquinas took up a patristic tradition of occasional reflection on the passions in connection with such topics as the suffering of Christ, the theological virtues of hope and charity, fear as a gift of the Holy Spirit, and the rewards and punishments of the afterlife.² In the treatise in the *Summa*, he uses his theological and philosophical sources on the passions, his skill at arranging material for maximum intelligibility, and his highly “formal” use of language to produce a comprehensive survey of the passions from the point of view of human nature and human action.³

“PASSION” AND ITS SUBJECT

The treatise is characterized by special distinctions between proper and improper senses of words. Meaning is extended on two sides. On one hand, particular passions lend their names to acts of will that resemble them (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 1, ad 3); in this respect the treatise both transcends its assigned topic and prepares an imagery and a vocabulary for dis-

cussions of more important, spiritual realities in the *Secunda secundae*.⁴ On the other hand, because passions are “motions” of sense-appetite that resemble motions of bodies, they and their effects are metaphorically described in terms of the latter (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; q. 37, a. 2); in this respect the treatise seems to support the view that poetry is the appropriate kind of speech about passion. With likeness to both, passions are motions situated “between” spiritual and bodily motions. All three kinds of motion occur in human nature, making up a complex “human motion” that, in its complexity, is morally problematic.

Aquinas’s vocabulary gives the actuations of intellect, will, sense-powers, and the locomotive power no distinctive names corresponding to *passiones*, the generic term for actuations or motions of sense-appetite. This term itself has several meanings, which the treatise begins by sorting out. The related verb *pati* in its widest sense refers to any reception, although reception without elimination should rather be called *perfici*, “a being brought to a perfection.” More properly, *pati* means reception accompanied by elimination; what is eliminated may be either unsuitable, as when a body gets rid of sickness in being healed, or suitable, as when a body loses health in becoming sick. The latter corresponds to the most proper sense of *passio*, because *pati* connotes a “being pulled” (*trahi*), and it seems to be the violence implied by “pulling” (“yanking” or “jerking” might be better here) that suggests a thing’s being taken away from what is suitable to it; *pati* in this most proper sense signifies a worsening, a production (*generatio*) of the worse out of the better that is, more precisely, a destruction (*corruptio*). Passion as mere reception occurs in the soul when it senses or un-

derstands; passion as reception with elimination occurs in the composite of soul and body when it is "affected" (*patitur*), and so only incidentally in the soul itself. Since change for the worse more properly has the nature (*ratio*) of passion than does change for the better, pain is more properly called a passion than is joy (Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 1). This point anticipates a striking theme of the treatise, that pain more fully has the nature of passion than does *any* of the other ten passions distinguished (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 1), being seconded in this respect by fear (Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 1). Pain is analogous to, as well as a direct cause of, bodily distress, and is itself called a sickness (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 37, a. 4). The treatise's question on the dire effects of pain on soul and body (Ia IIae, q. 37) is followed by one that, in keeping with classical and Arabic presentations of philosophy as a healing art,⁵ as well as with Dominican concern for *cura animarum*⁶ (cf. "psychiatry"), offers practical advice on alleviating pain. Is this advice emblematic of a quasi-medical intention throughout the treatise? Is passion a sickness of soul?

The opening comparisons of passion to disease and destruction, together with the second article's approving report of Cicero's term for passions, "perturbations" (Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 2, *sed contra*), do form an impression that passion is essentially disorder. Two questions later, however, Aquinas argues that Cicero's Stoic view of passions as intrinsically evil was mistaken, and that they are called perturbations or diseases only when not moderated by reason (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2). The initial perspective is clarified by remarks later in the *Prima secundae* concerning the effects of the fall into sin on the human sense-appetite; the second, wider perspective depends on the presentation in the *Prima pars* of human nature as a creature.

Aquinas's view of the integrity of human nature is suggestively sketched by Anton C. Pegis in an interpretation that proceeds by dramatic emphasis. The human soul is "not a substance *and* a form, but a substance *as* a form, a substance whose spiritual nature is essentially suited to informing matter." Explanation of this suitability must answer a question: "How does it happen that the soul, which is an immaterial and intellectual substance, has *lesser* than intellectual powers?" The question implies that understanding of the unity of

human nature must take its bearings from the highest human power, intellect. "The crux of the matter lies in seeing that, though man has powers in addition to the intellect, he is not *more* than intellectual. . . . [T]he human intellect is not fully an intellect *without the sensible powers*. . . . [T]he *intellect and the senses taken together* constitute in their togetherness the adequate intellectual power of the human soul as an intellectual substance." The human being is an intellect; but it is the kind of intellect that includes, because it needs, sense-powers; and sense-powers require the human body as their instrument, a body whose *raison d'être* is thus intellectual.⁷

While Pegis's remarks are based directly on *Quaestiones de anima*, the doctrine they sketch is implicit in qq. 75–76 of the *Prima pars*, and is therefore a premise of the questions on human action in the *Prima secundae*. The thematic difference between Ia, qq. 84–89 and Ia IIae, qq. 6–48 corresponds to Aquinas's contrast between the assimilating cognitive powers Pegis mentions, by which the soul takes things in, and the powers of will, sense-appetite, and locomotion, by which it "goes out" to things (Ia, q. 78, a. 1). One could ask about the part passion has in this complex "outgoing" of the soul (cf. "emotion") by echoing Pegis: how is it that an immaterial, intellectual substance is subject to passion, particularly in view of the fact that passion often vehemently interferes with intellectual operation (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 33, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 37, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 44, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 48, a. 3)?

The *Summa's* accounting for passion begins with the apparently axiomatic observation that "appetite"—a needy predilection to pursue a good—is a consequence of form (Ia, q. 80, a. 1): each still "shape" or form, it seems, is accompanied by a propelling "weight," that is, a tendency to move toward something good. In things without knowledge, which possess only their own forms, appetite is "natural"; in things capable of knowing, that is, of taking in forms of other things and containing them in a God-like way, the forms so received cause a higher kind of inclination, an appetitive power of soul (*ibid.*). Such a power is passive, for its nature is to be moved by what is apprehended in cognition; and because intellect and sense are distinct kinds of apprehensive power, intellectual appetite or will is correspondingly distinct

from sense-appetite (Ia, q. 80, a. 1). The human intellect is not fully an intellect *without* sense-powers, neither is it *without* two further powers: will, the power of going from its own universal to particular sense-appetite, the tendency toward the time-and-place-conditions of its sense-powers. The intellectual power of the human soul as an intellectual substance is constituted by sense-powers, will, and sense-appetite. Sense-appetite and its motions, are themselves "intellectual" on account of intellect—in the

So described, the four powers of the human soul form a four-sided figure in which sense-appetite terminates lines flowing from sense and will. Sense-appetite terminates lines flowing from sense and will more remote from, more "intellectual" than are either will or sense-appetite. The progression from sense-appetite to will parallels the progression from sense-appetite to will; there also co-operation between sense-appetite and will that parallels the co-operation between sense and intellect in the intellect. What relation is there between sense-appetite and will that parallels the relation between sense and intellect in the intellect? And what relation is there between sense-appetite and will that parallels the relation between sense and intellect in the intellect?

Sense-appetite has a complex relation to action, to which it contributes its own actuation (passion) and a body of action (*executio*) of passion. Its actuation is directed by the universal of reason acting through the "cogitative" power or "inner sense-power" that compares invisible intentions as danger, in objects of the intellect. The mediation allows universal to produce particular conclusions of passion, as when anger or fear is diminished by the application of practical considerations. Moreover, human sense-appetite, that of brute animals, does not merely carry out its bodily actuation; it awaits approval or disapproval of the appetitive power, the will (Ia, q. 24, a. 2).

PASSION AND ACTION

Although Aquinas is not explicit in the *Summa* with the upsets

from sense-appetite (Ia, q. 80, a. 2). If the human intellect is not fully an intellect without sense-powers, neither is it wholly itself without two further powers: will, the tendency following from its own universal apprehensions, and sense-appetite, the tendency following from the time-and-place-conditioned apprehensions of its sense-powers. The completed intellectual power of the human soul as an intellectual substance is constituted by intellect, senses, will, and sense-appetite together. Sense-appetite and its movements, the passions, are themselves “intellectual”—present on account of intellect—in the human soul.

So described, the four powers suggest a four-sided figure in which sense and will each terminate lines flowing from intellect, and sense-appetite terminates two other lines flowing from sense and will: sense-appetite is more remote from, more “opposed” to, intellect than are either will or sense. The progression from sense-powers to sense-appetite parallels the progression from intellect to will; is there also co-operation between sense-appetite and will that parallels co-operation between sense and intellect in abstractive knowledge? And what relation is suggested by the diagonal from intellect to sense-appetite?

Sense-appetite has a complex role in human action, to which it contributes both its own actuation (passion) and a bodily performance (*executio*) of passion. Its actuation, in keeping with the rule that appetite follows apprehension, is directed by the universal apprehension of reason acting through the intermediary of the “cogitative” power or “particular reason,” an inner sense-power that apprehends and compares invisible *intentiones* or “values,” such as danger, in objects of the outer senses. This mediation allows universal premises to produce particular conclusions that modify passion, as when anger or fear is aroused or diminished by the application of general considerations. Moreover, human passion, unlike that of brute animals, does not at once or inevitably carry out its bodily performance, but awaits approval or disapproval by the higher appetitive power, the will (Ia, q. 81, a. 3).

PASSION AND ACTION

Although Aquinas is much concerned in the *Summa* with the upsetting by sin of this

delicate order of reason, will, passion, and body, his deeper consideration is that human nature allowed for the upset, a point he regularly makes with reference to a comparison in Aristotle’s *Politics* according to which soul governs body with “despotic” rule and intellect governs appetite with “politic or kingly” rule.⁸ Aquinas’s commentary on the *Politics* explains that despotic rule is over slaves, who, because they belong entirely to the ruler, cannot offer any resistance, and so immediately, without contradiction, carry out the ruler’s command, whereas politic or kingly rule is over free citizens, who, as free, are able to contradict the ruler.⁹ The *Summa* reverses the comparison, making the political point illustrate the psychological one: in contrast to the slavish body, which “belongs entirely” to the soul and immediately obeys its command, sense-appetite, like a free citizen, has “something of its own” by which it can, even if it should not, resist reason’s command (Ia, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 7). Although sense-appetite’s resistance to reason is a result of sin, its partial self-possession is an essential, spirited aspect of human nature as it was in the beginning.

At first a mere possibility in the little kingdom of human nature, the uprising of passion against reason has since become the rule, as ordinary observation and the New Testament confirm: “What I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that I do”; and “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind” (Rom 7:15, 23; cf. Ia, q. 81, obj. 2; Ia IIae, q. 17, obj. 1 and ad 1; Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 2, *sed contra*). Rebellion can occur in the body because of a native or momentary disposition to foster and magnify a passion independently of reason’s direction (Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 7, ad 2). Human nature in the particular must be considered not only generically as animal and specifically as rational, but also with reference to the bodily makeup that is an individual’s own “nature”: predisposition to anger, for example, is more “natural,” in the sense of being more liable to be physically transmitted from parent to child, than is predisposition to desire for pleasure (Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 5). Such “genetic” considerations argue for mildness in moral judgments of particular cases of disordered passion and, more generally, respect for the material limitations of human freedom.

Sense-appetite itself can get ahead of reason because, together with its subordination to reason through the cogitative power, it has "something of its own" inasmuch as it can be moved by imagination and external senses, and so can resist reason by submitting to a sensing or imagining that dwells on something pleasant vetoed by reason or something unpleasant commanded by it (Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2). Moreover, a movement of sense-appetite can be suddenly aroused by an apprehension of imagination or sense, and such movement, called "antecedent" passion, pre-empts reason's command, although it could have been prevented had reason foreseen it (Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 7).¹⁰

By conditioning one to take as good what otherwise would not seem so, sense-appetite can move and dominate the will. In fact, it has an edge over will in predisposing action, for action concerns what is individual, and sense-appetite, unlike will, is a power directed to individual things, capable of making them appear in a certain light (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 2, ad 2; Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 1). Predisposition to action may come wholly from the intellectual part. If, however, intellect is "clouded" by passion, there is still some movement of will, and passion may be driven off, but human nature has become divided, with different "seemings" in different parts of its soul; in the extreme case of madness, passion compels the will to follow it (Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 3).

Of itself, as a movement of sense-appetite, passion is morally neither good nor evil, although there is something like moral goodness in the passion of brute animals inasmuch as it is directed by the knowledge and will of the Creator (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3). But as subject to the command of reason and will in human beings, passion is voluntary, being either commanded or not forbidden by will, and is morally good or evil to an even greater extent than is bodily movement, for sense-appetite is more "inward," "closer" to the will, than are bodily members (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 1). The apparently severe view of the Stoics that all passion is evil was due to their failure to distinguish between intellectual appetite and sense-appetite, which led them to use the term "will" to describe any rational movement of appetite and the term "passion" for any irrational one; the Peripatet-

ics, by contrast, called every movement of sense-appetite a passion, holding that such movement is good when made orderly by reason and bad when not (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2).

The Stoics of course held that all passion lessens the goodness of a human act. But according to the Peripatetic view, the perfection of human goodness requires that passion be not removed, but rather moderated by reason, for the human good, being based on reason, is more perfect when reason's domain is extended in human nature. Passions, no less than bodily movements, should be made orderly, not suppressed, by reason, so that, besides willing good and accomplishing it in bodily action, one may be moved toward it by the sense-appetite (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3). Goodness or evil of action may be increased by "consequent" passion, which follows a judgment of reason, either by "overflow" of the will's movement into sense-appetite, or by reason's choice to let sense-appetite be affected in a way that allows reason to act more readily (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1). Aquinas does argue that some passions, such as compassion and shame, are inherently good, and others, such as envy, inherently evil (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 4), but the paucity of his examples suggests that most kinds of passion are of themselves morally neutral, allowing the presence or absence of reason's moderating influence.

The treatise's general point concerning the moral need to have passion moderated and made orderly by reason prepares for subsequent discussions of sense-appetite as the subject both of the cardinal virtues courage and temperance (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 4), and of ravages in human nature caused by man's fall into sin (Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3).

DISTINCTION OF PASSIONS

Then, as fire moves upward by its form, being born to mount where it most abides in its matter, so the mind thus seized enters into desire, which is a spiritual movement, and never rests till the thing loved makes it rejoice.¹¹

—Dante, *Purgatory*, Canto XVIII, 28–33

The discussions of specific passions that occupy the bulk of the treatise contribute many

observations to the an- which is Thomas's go- The distinction among depends on the chain of istotelian psychology and clarify the obscure actuations of soul are objects, powers of soul and kinds of soul by t- ingly, specific differer- tuations of soul called formal distinctions an- appetite. The result eleven passions relate- fixed natural order. C- der can take its bearing and endpoint of appe- from its starting-point 25, a. 1). The latter p- the order of emergenc- constitutes a suite or narrative, of which g- comedy and traged- Knowledge of the wh- cially useful to one ch- enabling him to quick- dealing with a partic- some passion.

Formal differences sion are differences b- moving powers (Ia IIae 30, a. 2), of which th- tween the attractive "p- the repelling "push" tween the calming effe- the agitating attractio- that between the simp- such and the struggle- momentous (*arduum* sessed.¹³ A good that is, more exactly, sor- "calming," as distinc- "noble" (*bonestum*) g- delightful is the cons- ways at least remotely to an evil, to an absen- for struggle, appetite- something delightful- The three contrasts basis of their motiv- stated as follows: bet- lightful and the distu- poses it; between the

called every movement of passion, holding that such and when made orderly by reason not (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2). The course held that all passion is the effect of a human act. But according to the Aristotelian view, the perfection of passion requires that passion be rather moderated by reason, and, being based on reason, is within reason's domain is external in nature. Passions, no less than movements, should be made ordered, by reason, so that, being directed and accomplishing it in a certain way, it may be moved toward it by reason (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3). Goodness of passion may be increased by reason, which follows a judgment either by "overflow" of the passion into sense-appetite, or by reason to let sense-appetite be affected so that allows reason to act more effectively (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1). Aquinas does not distinguish passions, such as compassion, as inherently good, and others, as inherently evil (Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 3). The variety of his examples suggests that different kinds of passion are of themselves subject to allowing the presence or absence of moderating influence. A general point concerning the nature of passion moderated and directed by reason prepares for subsequent discussion of sense-appetite as the source of the cardinal virtues courage and temperance (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 4), and of the nature caused by man's fall (Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 3).

OF PASSIONS

The soul moves upward by its form, toward the amount where it most abides better, so the mind thus seized by desire, which is a spiritual movement and never rests till the thing loved makes it rejoice.¹¹

Paradise Lost, Canto XVIII, 28-33

Of specific passions that occur in the treatise contribute many

observations to the analysis of human action, which is Thomas's goal in the *Secunda pars*. The distinction among kinds of passion depends on the chain of inference by which Aristotelian psychology attempts to penetrate and clarify the obscure inwardness of souls: actuations of soul are distinguished by their objects, powers of soul by their actuations, and kinds of soul by their powers.¹² Accordingly, specific differentiation among the actuations of soul called passions is based on formal distinctions among objects of sense-appetite. The result is an enumeration of eleven passions related to one another in a fixed natural order. Consideration of this order can take its bearings either from the aim and endpoint of appetite, the delightful, or from its starting-point, the lovable (Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 1). The latter perspective reconstructs the order of emergence of the passions, which constitutes a suite or sequence that is like a narrative, of which genres of poetry such as comedy and tragedy represent portions. Knowledge of the whole story might be especially useful to one charged with care of souls, enabling him to quickly "find his place" when dealing with a particular soul caught up in some passion.

Formal differences among objects of passion are differences between effects of their moving powers (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 30, a. 2), of which three are crucial: that between the attractive "pull" of what is good and the repelling "push" of what is evil; that between the calming effect of a present good and the agitating attraction of an absent one; and that between the simple attraction of good as such and the struggle provoked by a great or momentous (*arduum*) good not easily possessed.¹³ A good that is an object of appetite is, more exactly, something "delightful" or "calming," as distinct from a "useful" or a "noble" (*honestum*) good (Ia, q. 5, a. 6). The delightful is the constant goal of appetite, always at least remotely in view—in responding to an evil, to an absent good, or to what calls for struggle, appetite anticipates the calm of something delightful beyond these objects. The three contrasts between objects on the basis of their motive power, then, may be stated as follows: between the calmingly delightful and the disturbingly painful that opposes it; between the present and the absent

delightful; and between the delightful as merely attractive and as something to be struggled toward.

The delightful is a subdivision of the good; good in turn is a transcendental property of beings.¹⁴ The objects of passion (that is, the delightful and its adumbrations) are *beings*, presented and apprehended in such a way as to move the soul. Good is a property of any being as such; in things themselves, an evil is a privation of good, but when apprehended, it becomes a "being of reason," taking on the status of a positive contrary (Ia IIae, q. 36, a. 1). The consequence for the appetite that follows apprehension is that what is evil is something to be fled, just as what is good is to be pursued; although, in knowledge and appetite, as in things themselves, good remains prior to and more forceful than evil. Hence, most passions belong to ordered pairs consisting of a primary response to the delightful and a secondary response to the painful.

The opposition between the delightful's presence and absence is the basis of the sequence of passion (Ia IIae, q. 30, a. 2). The completeness of a sequence, like completeness as such, is determined by the number three, which represents the togetherness of a beginning, middle, and end.¹⁵ In the sequence of passion, the threesome is illustrated by the three moments of natural action, namely inclination, movement, and rest, evident in the weight, fall, and repose of a body dropped to the ground (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 2). The three corresponding moments of passion are distinguished by the three appearances of the delightful, which most basically is agreeable (*conueniens*); but which also, if absent, is attractive; and if present, is wholly itself, that is, delightful or calming. The agreeable, the attractive, and the calming cause, respectively, the passions of love, desire, and delight, the basic moments in the sequence of passion.¹⁶ Each of these moments is matched by a passion caused by the appearance of the delightful's shadow and contrary, the painful, which most basically is disagreeable; but which also, if absent but approaching, is repellent, and if present, disturbing. The disagreeable causes love's contrary, hatred; the repellent desire's contrary, aversion; the disturbing delight's contrary, pain.

The first object of passion, the delightful as agreeable, is a good presented as simply good by apprehension and taken as simply good by appetite. In something like an act of attention, appetite fixes on—or, better, is “taken” by—this good so as to acquire a “kinship” (*connaturalitas*) or “harmony” with it, a “proportion” or “adaptation” to it, a state of being “well-pleased” with it (*complacentia*), these being so many characterizations of the primary passion, love (Ia IIae, q. 26, aa. 1–2; Ia IIae, q. 27, a. 1; Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 1).¹⁷ A loved good is something known to, if only to the extent of having been seen by, one who loves it; and it either actually or potentially resembles the one who loves it (Ia IIae, q. 27, aa. 2–3). Resemblance is oneness between lover and loved that precedes love; oneness of resemblance causes the “affective” oneness that is love itself; and love’s first effect is to lead the lover to “real” oneness with the known, loved good (Ia IIae, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2). Union of resemblance anticipates love; the union that is love anticipates the terminus of passion, delight; and “real” union coincides with delight.

The passion of love is a special case in Aquinas’s cosmic and metaphysical understanding of love, an understanding whose comprehensiveness rivals that of ancient pagan discussions of *eros*, but is alien to narrower, sentimental modern views. On one hand, he believes, as a Christian, that God *is* love and that the supreme human virtue is the love called charity (Ia, q. 20, a. 1; IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 6). On the other hand, he thinks that all natural things are moved by love. There is, in his view, an inevitable advance from knowledge to appetite, and from appetite to love, appetite’s first moment. In unknowing “natural” things (plants, for example), “natural appetite” and “natural love” follow solely from the Creator’s knowledge. Higher creatures have their own ability to know, and thus to originate the progression from knowledge to appetite to love. The appetite and love of the higher creatures is divided into two categories: “sensitive” in animals; “rational” in spiritual creatures (Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 1).

Human beings, as rational animals, are subject to both higher kinds of love. Although only sensitive love is a passion in the proper sense, the principal theme of the questions on love is “human” love, which is ambiguously

sensitive, rational, or both. Human love is clarified by two important distinctions: one contrasts love in general with the chosen, rational love called “dilection” and the perfect, appreciative love known as “charity”; the other divides all loves into “friendship-love” of someone—oneself or another—for his or her own sake and “concupiscent love” of what is loved *not* for its own sake, but as a good wanted *for* oneself or someone else (Ia IIae, q. 26, aa. 3–4).¹⁸

If sense-appetite begins by “harmonizing” with a kindred good thing, its second moment is a clash with what is alien and evil, that is, the painful as disagreeable (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 1). This “discord” of hatred can easily seem more forceful than love, but a hatred is always secondary to and weaker than some love, both because its object is intelligible only as the destruction of or obstacle to an agreeable good that is loved, and because its shrinking from harm is instrumental to love’s approach to a good (Ia IIae, q. 29, aa. 2–3). When transferred from sense-appetite to will, the notion of hatred is associated with two moral evils, self-hatred and hatred of truth. Although self-hatred, properly speaking, is impossible, since a thing can want only good for itself, a man, for example, may be said to “hate himself” inasmuch as he takes as good what is bad for him, or takes himself to be what is less than best in him, namely the mind (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 4). Again, while hatred of truth in general is impossible, a particular truth may be hated if someone wishes that it were not so, or wishes that it was left unknown (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 5). A peculiarity of hatred, even as a passion in the proper sense, is that its object may be universal, in contrast to the singularity of anger’s object (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 6). This seems to indicate a pre-rational basis for the hatreds that move groups of human beings against one another.

The static harmony and dissonance of love and hatred are followed by two lively movements of appetite: “concupiscence” or “desire,” the pursuit of a loved good that promises delight, and “aversion,” the flight from a hated evil that threatens pain. The first of these passions, and presumably the second, have analogues in movements of will (Ia IIae, q. 30, aa. 1–2). Desire is the attraction of appetite by and toward an approachable delightful good,

aversion the repelling of an approaching painful evil. The successive complications of desire and aversion imply infinity and difficulty (Ia IIae, q. 30, aa. 3–4).

IRASCIBLE PASSIONS

The generic object of irascible passion is the desirable and the avoidable, the agreeable and the painful. But sometimes, when the soul serves, the soul feels difficulty in pursuing the sensible good or avoiding the avoidable, inasmuch as these actions require the soul to perform them easily. These difficulties, which reveal a different kind of passion, namely sensible passion, are in themselves and difficult to avoid. Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes objects to actuations of irascible passion. He thinks that these two general passions are not merely a distinction of objects, but a division of a *concupiscible* power that is directed toward good or evil as such, and that responds to them as difficult (Ia, q. 81, a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 6). There are long-standing distinctions between concupiscible powers;¹⁹ but suggestions are seen in Plato’s distinction between the “spirited” parts of the soul and the distinction between “eros” and “thymos” instincts, and, more recently, in the modern distinction between the “sublime” and “the sublime.”²⁰

The concupiscible power is attracted as continually as possible, not only in special circumstances, but in latter signals interrupting the concupiscible flow of love toward the object and of hatred away from the object. The simple desire and aversion are not enough to ensure this attraction and repulsion; the soul resists the struggle. In meeting its difficulties, the soul seems to become potentially stronger. The higher perfection of an irascible passion is a concupiscible insofar as it is difficult, and the difficulty for the soul

al, or both. Human love is important distinctions: one general with the chosen, rational "dilection" and the perfect, the known as "charity"; the loves into "friendship-love" oneself or another—for his or "concupiscent love" of what its own sake, but as a good self or someone else (Ia IIae, q.

ite begins by "harmonizing" good thing, its second moment that is alien and evil, that is, the agreeable (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 1). Hatred can easily seem more agreeable, but a hatred is always weaker than some love, both of which is intelligible only as the result of an obstacle to an agreeable end, and because its shrinking is instrumental to love's approach (Ia IIae, q. 29, aa. 2–3). When transposed from appetite to will, the notion associated with two moral evils, the hatred of truth. Although self-hatred is impossible, since one can only be good for himself, a man can be said to "hate himself" because he takes as good what is bad for himself to be what is less than good (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 1). Hatred of truth in general is particular truth may be hated if it is not so, or wishes for the unknown (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 5). Hatred, even as a passion in the soul, that its object may be universal to the singularity of anger's object (Ia IIae, q. 29, a. 6). This seems to be the rational basis for the hatreds of human beings against one

mony and dissonance of love followed by two lively movements: "concupiscence" or "desire" of a loved good that promises pleasure, the flight from a hated good and pain. The first of these passions, and notably the second, have antecedents of will (Ia IIae, q. 30, aa. 1–2). The attraction of appetite by the approachable delightful good,

conversion the repelling of appetite by and from the approachable painful evil. Both the endless successiveness of natural desire and the unlimited complications of desire by rational calculation imply infinity and dissatisfaction (Ia IIae, q. 30, aa. 3–4).

IRASCIBLE PASSIONS

The generic object of love and hatred, desire and aversion, and delight and pain is sensible good and evil "as such"—the delightful and the painful. But sometimes, Aquinas observes, the soul feels difficulty in acquiring a sensible good or avoiding a sensible evil inasmuch as these actions are above one's ability to perform them easily. Such cases, he argues, reveal a different generic object of passion, namely sensible good or evil as momentous in itself and difficult to approach or avoid. Following Aristotle's inference from objects to actuations to powers, Aquinas thinks that these two generic objects indicate not merely a distinction between classes of passion, but a division of sense-appetite into a *concupiscible* power that responds to sensible good or evil as such, and an *irascible* power that responds to them as momentous and difficult (Ia, q. 81, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 1). There are long-standing objections to the distinction between concupiscible and irascible powers;¹⁹ but suggestive parallels may be seen in Plato's distinction between "desiring" and "spirited" parts of the soul, in Freud's distinction between "erotic" and "aggressive" instincts, and, more remotely, in the early modern distinction between "the beautiful" and "the sublime."²⁰

The concupiscible appetite seems to operate as continually as perception, the irascible only in special circumstances. Arousal of the latter signals interruption in the smooth concupiscible flow of love toward the delightful and of hatred away from the painful: suddenly simple desire and aversion are no longer enough to ensure this flow; an obstacle has appeared; the soul responds by tensing for struggle. In meeting its new, elevated object, the soul seems to become more alert and potentially stronger. The irascible appetite is a higher perfection of animal nature than is the concupiscible insofar as, by taking on a present difficulty for the sake of a remote good, it

approximates the foresight of reason; but despite its appearance of superior strength and knowingness, it depends on the concupiscible appetite, which it serves as a defender (Ia, q. 81, a. 1).²¹

The objects of the irascible appetite are complex: they are either good *and* hard to get, or evil *and* hard to avoid or defeat. The range of response in appetite is symmetrically complex: whereas the concupiscible appetite inclines simply toward good and away from evil, the irascible may either approach a promising difficult good *as* good, in hope, or fall away from it *as* unreachable, in despair. Furthermore, it may either shrink from a menacing difficult evil *as* evil, in fear, or attack it *as* a conquerable difficulty, in daring (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2). What decides whether it will hope for or despair of a momentous good, and whether it will timorously shrink from or daringly face a momentous evil, is a comparison between one's own forces and the object's difficulty (Ia IIae, q. 40, aa. 1–2, 4; Ia IIae, q. 41, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 5; Ia IIae, q. 43, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2), a comparison that seems further evidence of the irascible appetite's canniness. Since daring follows on hope of victory and despair on fear of difficulty (Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 2), hope and fear are the primary irascible passions. The objects of all these passions share the features "future" and "difficult," and are differentiated by the contrarities "good-evil," and "possible-impossible": a great future good that seems difficult but possible to obtain is hoped for (Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1); a great future evil that seems not only difficult but nearly impossible to overcome is feared (fear presumes *some* hope of escape [Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 2]); a great future evil that seems difficult but possible to overcome is daringly opposed (Ia IIae, q. 45, aa. 1–2); a great future good that seems not only difficult but impossible to obtain is despaired of (Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 4).

The treatise's discussion of these passions draws attention to their dependence on and fostering of distinctive, sometimes distorting perspectives on time, particularly on the future. Experience causes hope inasmuch as it allows the time for acquiring skill at doing something easily, or reveals that what seemed impossible is not; but it also causes despair by showing that what seemed possible is impossible (Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 5). On the other hand,

hope is prominent in those without foresight, such as the young, the drunken, and the thoughtless (Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 6); despite its element of calculation, hope easily becomes foolish. In fear, the irascible appetite's projection onto the future is confined to a middle ground between unimaginably remote and apparently inevitable evils, both of which exclude fear (Ia IIae, q. 42, a. 2). Fear is especially aroused by the appearance of a sudden or an irremediable evil, which, respectively, focus attention on an imminent and an everlasting future (Ia IIae, q. 42, aa. 5-6). Daring makes one enter into action confidently, but quickly become discomfited by unforeseen danger; this effect is contrary to that of the virtue of courage, which makes one begin to act slowly and deliberately, but then persevere in the midst of expected danger (Ia IIae, q. 45, a. 4).

The irascible passions in general elevate the soul above the level of the comparatively sluggish concupiscible appetite. Anger, the passion with no contrary, is an extreme condition of the irascible appetite itself. Anger presupposes a complex configuration of other passions; it simultaneously looks to both good and evil, and to both past and present; and it implies the workings of reason and justice (Ia IIae, q. 46, aa. 1, 2, 4, 7). The moving cause of anger is something done against one angered (Ia IIae, q. 47, a. 1). Although the objects of all irascible passions imply difficulty, and so some kind of "againstness," only anger essentially presupposes opposition by a person, specifically one who has performed an act manifesting a deliberate, unjust slight of the one made angry. But the remembered evil act is only part of anger's complex object: an angry man looks not only back on the demeaning pain he has suffered, but also forward to a vengeance that he dares as a victory, and desires and hopes for as a pleasant, reasoned act of justice. The reasoning consists in comparing and inferring: "Since you have done this unjust harm to me, I will repay you with another, similar harm that will restore justice between us" (Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 4). The prospect of a justice accomplished both by and for oneself is singularly enticing, and the pleasure of revenge is already present in the thought of and hope for it (Ia IIae, q. 48, a. 1). Anger's object is bittersweet, blending past

painful injustice into future pleasant revenge, the latter appearing as an attractive restoration of equilibrium.

Despite its "intelligent" sophistication, anger, more than any other passion, disturbs the body and therefore the power of reason (Ia IIae, q. 48, aa. 2, 4). Anger listens to reason, but imperfectly—the harm suffered provokes it to begin to follow reason, but not to submit to the measure of reason in meting out revenge. Its syllogism thus tends to be specious, inasmuch as the vengeance planned tends *not* to be comparable to the harm suffered, but rather excessive (Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 4, ad 3). In its reasoned beginning, anger, aware of its potential for excess, holds back speech; at an intermediate point, when it begins to eclipse reason but has not yet wholly seized the body, it may give way to loquacity; but eventually it immobilizes the body in general and the tongue in particular, and so again hinders speech (Ia IIae, q. 48, a. 4). It advances from lively, percipient reasoning to blind, mute paralysis. Still, successful anger—as distinct from the lingering resentment of the "embittered" (Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 8)—issues in the pleasure of revenge, and because its intensely imagined end is finite, it is, unlike the more steady state of hatred, transient (Ia IIae, q. 46, a. 6). Its limited temporal arc, its union of past, present, and future, its presumption of reason and justice, and its development of relations between persons make anger an eminently dramatic passion.

DELIGHT AND PAIN

The objects of irascible passions result from complications of the absent good and evil that are objects of desire and aversion. The absence of all these objects is converted into presence when a remote good or evil is united with the subject of appetite to produce delight or pain. These final passions, anticipated by earlier ones, are the two ways in which appetite's movement, toward or from, comes to a stop, delight resembling a "natural" repose, pain a violent arrest (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 8, ad 2). In love and hatred, appetite seems indifferent to time; in desire, aversion, and the irascible passions, it projects itself onto the future; in delight and pain, it is absorbed into the present. Although delight

may be prolonged, it, like *tota*, complete in the instant (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1-2; cf. Ia, q. 10, a. 1). Delight, a momentary successiveness, and from the moment it is entailed by desire, aversion, and the irascible passions. The ever-renewed passion causes attention to the approaching future moment to be present one.

The objects of delight, like those of pain, are, respectively, a good embraced and an evil avoided. Delight is the perceived completion (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1) of the conscious taking possession of a loved and desired—and not yet attained—end. Despair is the loss of the object of hope, and the cause is operation: delight is the taking of something, or rather the taking of a thing, namely taking hold of a thing, the finalization of the taking-hold. Pain, delight's formal contrary, is the forced union with an evil that cannot be avoided—and perhaps feared. The priority of good to evil, the priority of removal of an enjoyed or desired object (Ia IIae, q. 36, aa. 1-2). It also implies the disposing and an efficient cause: the subject's longing for a being, namely unity, and the desire to sever in the experience of pain (Ia IIae, q. 36, a. 3); the subject's longing force (Ia IIae, q. 36, a. 3).

After establishing the objects of delight, Aquinas identifies the objects of knowing and objects of human delight. An important feature of that change causes human delight: reasons: because our objects are changeable, finds different objects at different times; because the objects of delight may become excessive, the pleasure; and because our objects are wholly leads us to enjoy them one by one (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 8, ad 2). Our delight, which is a moment, nevertheless, either because the moment is either because the moment is our situation, or because the moment passes for the sake of the object of delight and delight.

may be prolonged, it, like eternity, is *simul tota*, complete in the instant (Ia IIae, q. 31, aa. 1–2; cf. Ia, q. 10, a. 1). It is thus, for one delighted, a momentary escape from time's successiveness, and from estimations of time entailed by desire, aversion, and the irascible passions. The ever-renewed sequence of passion causes attention to alternate between an approaching future moment and a consuming present one.

The objects of delight and pain are, respectively, a good embraced and an invading evil. Delight is the perceived achievement of a completion (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1). It is the conscious taking possession of a good that was loved and desired—and perhaps hoped for, despaired of, or sought in anger. Its proper cause is operation: delight consists in *doing* something, or rather two things together, namely taking hold of a good and taking cognizance of the taking-hold (Ia IIae, q. 32, a. 1). Pain, delight's formal contrary, is a perceived, forced union with an evil that was hated and avoided—and perhaps feared or met with daring (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 1). In keeping with the priority of good to evil, pain presupposes removal of an enjoyed or desired good (Ia IIae, q. 36, aa. 1–2). It also presupposes both a disposing and an efficient cause: the former is the subject's longing for what is proper to it as a being, namely unity, a unity that pain seems to sever in the experience of a "falling apart" (Ia IIae, q. 36, a. 3); the latter is an overwhelming force (Ia IIae, q. 36, a. 4).

After establishing the complex operation of "knowing appropriation" as the cause of delight, Aquinas identifies particular ways of knowing and objects of knowledge that cause human delight. An important general point is that change causes human delight for three reasons: because our nature, being itself changeable, finds different things suitable at different times; because an object of our delight may become excessive and so no longer please; and because our desire to know things wholly leads us to enjoy considering their parts one by one (Ia IIae, q. 32, a. 2). Thus, our delight, which is a stasis complete in the moment, nevertheless thrives on change, either because the moment passes in ourselves or our situation, or because the moment *must* pass for the sake of completeness of knowledge and delight.

As ever-looming end-points in the sequence of passion, delight and pain, whether expected or actual, constantly sway human choice. Precisely as end-points, that is, as encounters with anticipated good or evil, they are difficult to explain, for there is nothing beyond them with reference to which they can be analyzed. They are partially clarified by distinctions Aquinas draws between contraries, between what is essential ("of itself") and what is accidental, between prior and posterior, and between greater and less. Pursuit of delight is of itself prior to flight from pain (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 6). Both delight and pain have intellectual analogues, joy and sorrow, which of themselves are more powerful than their bodily counterparts (Ia IIae, q. 31, aa. 3–5; Ia IIae, q. 49; Ia IIae, q. 35, aa. 2, 7). While delight and pain are formally contrary to one another, they may, with respect to different objects, be simply disparate or even complementary (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 4). The instrumental delights of touch are most powerful of bodily delights, but the cognitive delights of sight are superior by association with intellectual delight (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 6). The delight of contemplation is directly opposed by no corresponding pain, although the distraction of bodily pain severely hinders it (Ia IIae, q. 35, a. 5). Delights are applied as remedies for pains (Ia IIae, q. 38, a. 1). Taken together, these distinctions portray intense competition for attention between delights and pains, among delights, and among pains. The moral significance of all passions is due to their capacity to attract, command, or absorb the soul's attention. The principal irascible passions, hope and fear, are particularly attention-getting (Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 8; Ia IIae, q. 44, a. 4), but the theme of attention is most prominent in the discussions of delight and pain.

It is the complexity of human nature, the multiplicity of powers rooted in its soul's single essence, that makes possible a contest for attention among objects of different powers: since one soul can have but one attention, attraction of attention to an object of one power involves withdrawal from that of another, so that consideration of what absorbs much attention is incompatible with consideration of anything else requiring much attention (cf. Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 1). Accordingly, because pain, in particular bodily pain, com-

mands the soul's attention imperiously, to an even greater extent than does delight, it interferes with learning and with consideration of what is already known (Ia IIae, q. 37, a. 1).

Pain's capacity to distract may be countered by love of learning and of contemplation, but pain is a powerful natural enemy of intellect. Pain is felt as a weight on the soul that tends to immobilize the movements of soul and body (Ia IIae, q. 37, a. 2). It also tends to impair action it accompanies, since one who is pained by what he does to that extent does it badly, although pain accompanied by hope of escape is an incentive to the action of getting rid of it (Ia IIae, q. 37, a. 3). Delight is to pain as rest is to weariness: the natural remedy. Aquinas allows that any delight mitigates pain, but particularly recommends weeping, condolence by friends, bathing and sleep, and the greatest of delights, contemplation of truth, which he says can lessen even bodily pain (Ia IIae, q. 38). Thus pain hinders learning and contemplation, and contemplation alleviates pain. The treatise's most far-reaching conclusion concerning the passions seems to be that intellectual knowledge is at odds with pain, but at its highest coincides with the greatest delight.

When it supervenes on another operation, the operation of delight perfects by adding to the good of the other operation the completing good of appetite's natural repose. Delight also perfects operation indirectly inasmuch as one who delights in what is done gives it an attention and care that help in doing it well (Ia IIae, q. 33, a. 4). Hence, delight in an act of reasoning is no impediment; rather, it is a help to the reasoning, although bodily delight may hinder the use of reason by distracting the soul's attention, by opposing the measure of reason through excess, or by incapacitating reason (Ia IIae, q. 33, a. 3).

The doctrine that delight as such is morally evil is doubly wrong: it is based on the erroneous assumption that all delights are bodily; further, it is rhetorically self-defeating, since no one can live without bodily pleasures, and when they who teach the doctrine are discovered taking such pleasure their hearers will be more impressed by what they do than what they say. Delight may be good or evil, depending on whether it is taken in what is in keeping with reason, and whether it accompanies right action (Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 1). In fact, the measure

of moral goodness is the delight one's will takes in right action (Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 4). The Epicurean view that delight as such is good fails to distinguish between what is of itself good and what is good "to" someone: if the latter is merely a qualified good on the assumption of a diseased condition, or an appearance of good based on misjudgment of what is suitable, then the delight is not, simply speaking, good, nor even, simply speaking, delight (Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 2).

Of itself, as the troubling of appetite by a present evil that interferes with its repose in a good, pain is an evil. But on the supposition that something painful is present, pain is good, for its absence would imply failure either to recognize the presence of the painful or to see and resist it *as* repugnant. In the case of bodily pain, this recognition and resistance are evidence of a healthy nature (Ia IIae, q. 39, a. 1); in the case of interior pain (sadness or sorrow), perception of evil based on right judgment of reason and resistance to it based on a well-disposed will make of sorrow a noble good (Ia IIae, q. 39, a. 2). Sorrow can also be a useful good, not in its mere opposition to a present evil, but in its further impulse to avoid evils that ought to be avoided, notably sin and its occasions: by taking these as not only evil but also painful, sorrow usefully doubles the motive for avoiding them (Ia IIae, q. 39, a. 3). This allusion to a useful sorrow for sin in general anticipates the discussion in the *Tertia pars* of repentance, the sorrow for past sins that is a virtue and a sacrament (IIIa, q. 84, a. 1; IIIa, q. 85).

To the extent that they involve recognition of and reaction to their respective objects, delight and pain operate symmetrically. To the extent that their recognition is accurate and their reaction appropriate, delight and pain are both good. No pain or sorrow, then, can be the greatest human evil. Sorrow for what appears evil but is, in fact, good is a lesser evil than would be loss of that good; sorrow for what is truly evil at least retains the goods of right judgment and right reaction (Ia IIae, q. 39, a. 4). On the other hand, there *is* a delight that is the greatest human good, namely the intellectual enjoyment of God, which is the rational creature's happiness. The immediate relevance of the treatise on the passions to *sacra doctrina* concerns the moral need to have what are properly speaking passions moderated by rea-

son. But the treatise's remarks on "passive involvement in the Church's sorrowful repentance"

Aquinas states that the course between Stoicism and Aristotle, holding that some delights are good but also that none is evil. At this point, Aquinas argues that the errors of Plato thought that the good comes from the imperfect act of rest and movement, and so that the good is perfection. This clear distinction is not of intellectual delight but of the coming of the good in wonder and learning of what is already known. Plato took as best the good, simply speaking, an abstract good, "good itself" compared to the good. But, Aquinas says in response to this "good is the best in human nature" what is best in human nature is its ultimate end, which may mean either what is best in itself, or to enjoy the good, or to enjoy the good that can be called "the good" (Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 3). Hence, that enjoyment of God is the good of contemplation (Ia IIae, q. 38) leaves it to the reader to see the arguments against Plato's argument of contemplation as a passion in the proper sense, the high point of the discussion as of the entire treatise.

The refutation of the Stoic genealogy. On one hand, the analysis of passion in the *Sentences*, as well as in the commentaries, including Aquinas himself, had reserved for a survey of Christian teaching towards and punishment of sinners.²² On the other hand, the doctrines from Plato mediated and corrected in the *Ethics*.²³ Here, as elsewhere, this Aristotelian text is in line with Christian teaching towards the intellectual vision

son. But the treatise's wider significance lies in its remarks on "passions" of will and their involvement in the Christian divine comedy of sorrowful repentance leading to joyous vision.

Aquinas states that Plato steered a middle course between Stoics and Epicureans, holding that some delights are good and some bad, but also that none is the best good. This last point, Aquinas argues, was based on two errors. Plato thought that delight as such results from the imperfect actualities of coming-to-be and movement, and so cannot be an ultimate perfection. This clearly is true of bodily but not of intellectual delight, which accompanies not only the coming into being of knowledge in wonder and learning, but also contemplation of what is already known. Furthermore, Plato took as best the highest good simply speaking, an abstracted and unparticipated "good itself" comparable to the creator God. But, Aquinas says in an echo of Aristotle's response to this "good itself," we are speaking of what is best in human things. What is best for a thing is its ultimate end. But since "its end" may mean either what it desires to have or the very having (*usus*), the "ultimate end" may refer to God Himself, the highest good simply speaking, or to enjoyment of God, a delight that can be called "the best of human goods" (Ia IIae, q. 34, a. 3). Having already established that enjoyment of God consists in an act of contemplation (Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 8), Aquinas leaves it to the reader to bring together his two arguments against Plato. Although the enjoyment of contemplating the first cause is not a passion in the proper sense, it is the thematic high point of the discussion of delight, as well as of the entire treatise on the passions.

The refutation of Plato has an interesting genealogy. On one hand it introduces into the analysis of passion a topic that *The Book of Sentences*, as well as the tradition of *Sentences* commentaries, including that of Aquinas himself, had reserved for the very end of their survey of Christian doctrine, namely the rewards and punishment following the last judgment.²² On the other hand, it is a response to doctrines from Plato's *Republic* and *Philebus* mediated and corrected by the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²³ Here, as elsewhere, Aquinas turns to this Aristotelian text to give expression to the Christian teaching that our last end, that is, the intellectual vision of the greatest good, is

also our greatest delight.²⁴ In analogous ways, then, the delightful, itself an analogous subdivision of the good, is presented by the treatise on the passions as the goal both of passion and of human life as a whole

Notes

¹Servais Pinckaers, "Les passions et la morale," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74 (1990): 379.

²*In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2 (Moos, 481–506); d. 26, q. 1 (Moos, 813–30); d. 27, q. 1 (Moos, 853–71); d. 34; *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3 (Vivès, 505–24); *De veritate*, q. 26 (Leonine, 745–87).

³Mark D. Jordan, "Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 33 (1986): 71–97.

⁴Pinckaers, "Les passions et la morale," 382.

⁵See Thérèse-Anne Druart, "Al-Kindi's Ethics," *Review of Metaphysics* 47 (1993): 329–57, which points out similarities between Al-Kindi's *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* and Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* (348, n. 61).

See also Edward M. Macierowski, "The Thomistic Critique of Avicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint of the Divine Simplicity, with Special Reference to the 'Summa Contra Gentiles'" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1979), 147–53, which, in connection with Avicenna's allusive, possibly esoteric, manner of writing, discusses the names of his philosophical work titled "Book of Healing," and of its abridgement, titled "Rescue." The principal sources of Aquinas's remedies, however, seem to be Aristotelian and patristic rather than Arabic; see Mario E. Sacchi, "La terapéutica del dolor y la tristeza según Santo Tomás," *Psychologica* 2 (1979): 85–104.

⁶See Leonard E. Boyle, O.P., *The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas*, The Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), 3–4.

⁷Anton C. Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Unity of Man," in *Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart*, ed. James A. McWilliams (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Co., 1955), 168–69. Michael Sweeney, in "Allan Bloom and Thomas Aquinas on Eros and Immortality," *Interpretation* 23 [1996]: 445–56, states the point concisely: "As Anton Pegis puts it, the whole human being is an intellect" (452). In his Thomistic response to a contemporary authority on passion, Sweeney makes effective use of Pegis's important but rarely exploited work.

⁸Arist. *Pol.* 1254b5–7.

⁹*In I politicorum*, chap. 3 (Leonine, A87, 143–66).

¹⁰Antecedent passion is a consequence of sin and therefore absent from unfallen human nature (ST Ia, q. 95, a. 2; IIIa, q. 15, a. 4).

¹¹*The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri*, with translation and comment by John D. Sinclair; *II Purgatorio* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 232–35. “Poi, come ‘l foco movesi in altura/ per la sua forma ch’è nata a salire/ là dove più in sua materia dura,/ così l’animo preso entra in disire,/ ch’è moto spiritale, e mai non posa/ fin che la cosa amata il fa gioire.”

¹²In *II De anima*, chap. 6 (Leonine, 93–94, 118–90). See Lawrence Dewan’s discussion of early thirteenth-century use of the term *obiectum* in his “*OBIECTUM*: Notes on the Invention of a Word,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 48 (1981): 37–96.

¹³My rendering of *arduum* as “great or momentous” follows R.-A. Gauthier’s conclusion, “*L’arduum, c’est le grand*,” in *Magnanimité: L’idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (*Bibliothèque Thomiste* 28) (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1951), 325; see 321–5 for the argument.

¹⁴ST Ia, q. 5, aa. 1–3; see “Good as Transcendental,” in Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 290–334.

¹⁵Arist. *Cael.* 1.1 (268a12–19); *In I De caelo*, lect. 2, nn. 4–6 (Leonine, 6–7).

¹⁶All passions are called *movements of soul* (ST Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 2, *sed contra*). But in the detailed analogy between natural agents and objects of passion, the image of movement is restricted to the intermediate moment, between inclination and repose, of passion (Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1); only desire, aversion, and the passions of the irascible appetite are movements in this narrower sense. The apparent inconsistency is partially resolved by the explanation that delight both is and is not movement: in delight the movement of getting hold of a good (*motus executionis*) ceases, but appetite’s movement of intending its end continues. This is because, although the presence of the good in one way stills the appetite, the alteration of appetite by its object continues, making delight in another sense a movement (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2).

¹⁷On these and other terms Aquinas uses to describe love, see H.-D. Simonin, “Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l’amour,” *Archives de l’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 6 (1931): 176–97; Frederick E. Crowe, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” *Theological Studies* 20 (1959): 26–9. On love as a “being taken,” see the lines from Dante quoted above; and David M. Gallagher’s “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas” (*Acta Philosophica* 4 [1995]: 51–71), which construes Aquinas’s use of *complacentia* as “emphasizing

... the *psychological* experience of being taken, so to speak, by the object” (54).

¹⁸Some important implications of both distinctions are clarified by Gallagher in “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,” *Mediaeval Studies* 58 (1996): 1–47.

¹⁹Descartes, *Les passions de l’âme* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1988), 2d pt., art. 68, 114–15.

²⁰Pl. *Resp.* 439d–441c (see also Pl. *Ti.* 69c–72d); Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1961), 77.

Inasmuch as it finds the sublime on pain and the beautiful on pleasure, Edmund Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958) does not provide a parallel with the concupiscible-irascible distinction; but Burke does associate the sublime with greatness and difficulty, and regards it as a cause of several passions treated by Aquinas as irascible. Paul Ricouer calls it “the penetrating insight of scholastic psychology, that the irascible is not reducible to the concupiscible, but aims at the arduous as the concupiscible aims at pleasure.” *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. Erazim V. Kohák (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 116, n. 14.

²¹*In De sensu, Prohemium* (Leonine, 8, 222–49).

²²*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, *divisio textus* (Vivès, 456).

²³Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 10.3 (1173a29–b7); 1.6 (1096b10–350).

²⁴See the prologue to Aquinas’s *In De causis* (Safrey, 2, 12–13), which, like ST Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 4, quotes Jn 17:3.

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