

Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49–70)

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Modern readers sometimes see in the scholastic practice of citing “authorities” an excessive concern with tradition, or an aversion to original thinking, or both. In interpreting the *Summa theologiae*, this is a serious, though natural, mistake. In fact, Thomas operates very much like a host laboring to produce congenial, fruitful conversation among guests deeply at odds with each other. Like all good hosts, he conceals how hard he must work to ensure that conflicts are defused and the party goes well. Sometimes Thomas repeats, approvingly, the words of an authority while giving them a meaning rather different from what the author intended. (One would need a knowledge of the history of ethics independent of the “history” offered by the *Summa* to recognize such distortions.) Sometimes he sounds as if he agrees wholeheartedly when he actually agrees only with significant reservations. And sometimes his reservations become clear only later in the *Summa*, so that his earlier statements appear, retrospectively, in an altogether different light.

SECOND NATURE

Thanks to this triumph of diplomacy, the whole project of synthesizing the chaotic array of Greek, Hellenistic, Muslim, and Christian sources into a single, coherent theory of virtue appears far less demanding than it actually was. In explaining the *Summa*’s account of habits and virtues, I shall accordingly try to provide enough historical background to compensate for Thomas’s finesse. To appreciate his own innovations, one needs some sense of the serious philosophical problems he actually faced and worked to solve.

When Aristotle places virtue in the metaphysical genus of *habit* (or *hexis*), he runs true to form for classical ethics. Philosophers of antiquity were much impressed by the many years of learning and practice necessary to become a thoroughly admirable human specimen. While they all emphasized the intellectual prerequisite of “practical wisdom” (Greek: *phronesis*; Latin: *prudentia*), they also emphasized the long conditioning, habituation, and sheer practice necessary to produce excellent moral character. Hence Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue: “a *hexis* concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”¹

The Greek *hexis* was translated into Latin as *habitus* and thence into English as “habit.” The English word tends to mislead insofar as habit can signify for English speakers any routine performance, however trivial or mechanical—tugging at one’s necktie, for example, or wincing at the scream of a police siren. A *hexis* or *habitus*, in contrast, is a durable characteristic of the agent inclining to certain kinds of actions and emotional reactions, not the actions and reactions themselves. Acquired over time, habits grow to be “second nature” for the individual. Aristotle himself appeals to this factor in distinguishing habits from other qualities he labels mere “conditions”:

A habit (*hexis*) differs from a condition in being more stable and lasting longer. Such are the branches of knowledge and the virtues. . . . It is what are easily changed and quickly changing that we call conditions, e.g., hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like. For a man is in a certain condition by dint of these, yet he changes quickly from being hot to cold

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and from being healthy to being sick. Similarly with the rest of the conditions, unless indeed even one of these were eventually to become through length of time part of a man's nature and irremediable or exceedingly hard to change—and then one would perhaps call this a habit.²

The idea of virtue as a habit and habit itself as a second nature was a commonplace for the Romans as well as the Greeks. There was, however, some divergence in terminology. When commenting on Aristotle's works, Latin authors tended to use the word *habitus* for the Greek *hexis*—an etymologically sound translation, as Thomas points out, because both words have their root in the verb “to have” (Ia IIae, q. 49, a. 1). On the other hand, when writing without any special reference to Aristotle, Latin authors commonly spoke of “custom” or “usage” (*consuetudo*) rather than habit (*habitus*) as “another nature” or a “second nature.”³ Despite their differences, both words can indeed signify those characteristics which become natural and enduring through long practice, thereby making the individual, in one way or another, the person she is: a brilliant mathematician, a brave soldier, or a faithful wife, and likewise, negatively, a mathematical moron, a contemptible coward, or a despicable cheat.

The arcane topic of translation deserves mention on two grounds. First, Augustine gave serious thought to the process of habituation, spoke of habits in many of his works, but typically used the word “custom” (*consuetudo*), not *habitus*. Second, although he was well aware that classical philosophers described moral virtue as the product of habituation, as a second nature we create through our own activities, Augustine himself insisted that all true virtues are forms of charity: the love of God that God alone can give. What good is the learning and practice so prized by the ancients when genuine virtue requires a radical, divinely produced change in values? According to Augustine, apparent virtues in pagans are actually hidden vices. Even when pagan virtues are sought for their own sake, those attaining them are inflated by pride in their own characters.⁴ As Augustine regarded charity as the root of all virtues, so he regarded pride as the root of all sins. He thus

saw habit not as the genus of virtue but closer to the enemy of virtue—so many chains forged by our own wills, making it all the harder for us to love most what most deserves to be loved.⁵

Indeed, Augustine lived to regret having reproduced in one of his works Cicero's famous definition of virtue as “a habit of the soul conforming to the mode of nature and of reason” (*animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus*).⁶ As Augustine's works were copied and circulated, so, too, was this definition, leading him finally to complain that it was Cicero's definition, not his own, and that he included it at the request of others.⁷ What, then, should we make of Thomas's decision to define virtue as a habit (Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4)? Does it represent a rejection, however tactful, of Augustine's teachings? To answer the question, we need to understand exactly what Thomas means by a habit.

RETHINKING HABITS

In the section of the *Summa* known as “the treatise on habits” (Ia IIae, qq. 49–54), Thomas draws so heavily on Aristotle and his commentators that he seems at first glance to be following ancient thought quite closely. Like Aristotle, Aquinas places habits in the category of quality, where they are distinguished from other qualities by both their durability and their tendency to dispose the possessor well or badly (Ia IIae, q. 49, aa. 1–2). As he explains that habits are, by their very nature, principles of action (Ia IIae, q. 49, a. 3), Thomas appears to be continuing in the Aristotelian vein, but already a strangely un-Aristotelian idea has crept in. Citing a commentary by Averroes on Aristotle's *De anima*, Thomas declares that “a habit is that whereby we act when we *will*” (Ia IIae, q. 49, a. 3).⁸ He quotes this dictum again and again, not only in the *Summa theologiae* but also in other works, from his youthful commentary on the *Sentences* onward, despite the fact that Aristotle himself claimed no such relationship between habit and will.⁹ When Thomas proceeds to argue that certain habits are infused in us by God, it becomes all the more evident that ancient philosophy has been left behind (Ia IIae, q. 51, a. 4). Our second natures need not be generated naturally and gradually,

Thomas argues that we can always refuse to act in accordance with our habits and can even choose to act against our habits. Where Aristotle repeatedly suggests that the truly virtuous are beyond danger of degeneration, just as the truly vicious are beyond hope of improvement, Thomas has no such confidence.¹⁵ Habits make it harder, but never impossible, for the virtuous among us to degenerate and the vicious among us to improve (Ia IIae, q. 53, aa. 1–3; Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 2).

Among the powers of the human soul, some are better suited than others to developing habits, just as people are better suited than animals. Insofar as a power acts from natural instinct, it cannot acquire habits in the strict sense. Thomas accordingly sees more room for habits in the sensory *appetite*, the seat of emotions, than in powers of sensory *apprehension* such as memory and imagination (Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 3, ad 3). In downgrading the latter powers he appeals to their connection with the body, the force of sheer repetition in conditioning them to operate in certain ways, how they tend to influence, instead of being influenced by, our intellectual judgment of the particular situation in which we find ourselves, and just how far removed they are from the control of the will (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 5, ad 1). Here we see the influence of Aristotle's psychology, but perhaps Thomas also recalls Augustine's agony at the inability to control his own memory and the tempting images it produced.¹⁶ Dreams of what we believed we long ago stopped wanting, what we would now never seek in our waking lives, might be taken as evidence of the deeply uncontrollable aspect of imagination and memory.

The *Summa* uses the saying of Averroes—that a habit is that whereby we act when we *will*—to support an even more radical claim: from the essential character (*ratio*) of a habit alone, it is plain that a habit is *principally* related to the will (Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 5).¹⁷ To say the least, this represents a substantial departure from Aristotle's teachings. Aristotle holds people responsible for actions proceeding from passion or non-rational appetite even when the agent acts against her own choice, her own reasoned and settled conception of the good. No single power of the soul is even the indirect source of all moral actions. Thomas, however, regards the

will as just such a source.¹⁸ In his view, human beings are blamed for tantrums, fits of gluttony, and other such actions because we never act from passion without the consent of our wills. Animals cannot fairly be blamed for apparently similar behavior because they lack the power of will. They are not, as are human beings, "masters" of their own actions. Although reason might at first appear more important, the will receives increasing attention as the *Prima secundae* unfolds.

THE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE

The *Summa's* discussion of human virtue as a habit, an "operative" habit, and a good habit (Ia IIae, q. 55, aa. 1–3) should be seen not only in relation to the preceding treatise on habits but also in relation to the definition of virtue that immediately follows (Ia IIae, q. 55, aa. 1–3). For the topic is initially *human* virtue, a restriction Thomas stresses (for example, Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 3), and yet the definition is not restricted to human virtue. Why, one wonders, does the adjective "human" drop out?

The aim cannot be to make the definition wide enough to accommodate the virtues of animals, for animals are unable to develop habits in the strict sense, much less virtues. Instead, Thomas wants his definition to cover both the human virtues acquired through our own natural resources and the superhuman virtues Christians have through God's grace. Aristotle, he believes, had some valuable insights in the first area. Thus the division between moral and intellectual virtues provided by the *Nicomachean Ethics* can be considered adequate for human virtues (*virtutes humanas*). But as Aristotle failed to consider faith, hope, and charity, those virtues of human beings (*virtutes hominis*) that surpass our nature and make us participants in God's grace, his definition of virtue proves myopic (Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 3, ad 3).

The definition of virtue chosen for discussion accordingly comes not from the *Nicomachean Ethics* but from Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, the standard theological textbook of the day: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live rightly, of which no one makes bad use, which God works in us without us" (Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4).¹⁹ Recognizing that the textbook definition was pieced to-

gether from the words of Augustine, Thomas expresses firm approval: "It should be said that this definition embraces perfectly the whole essential character (*ratio*) of virtue. For the complete essential character of anything is gathered from all of its causes. The preceding definition, however, comprehends all the causes of virtue" (Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4).²⁰ The article continues by discussing the formal, material, final, and efficient causes of virtue, along with some apparently modest suggestions for revision.

In discussing virtue's formal component, for example, Thomas proposes to substitute "habit" (*habitus*) for "quality" in order to make the definition "more appropriate." He gives no justification other than a perfunctory allusion to Aristotle's categories. Remember, though, that Thomas has already stretched the ancient concept of habit to cover God-given dispositions and described all habits as principally related to the will. In the next question of the *Summa* he also takes pains to distinguish his own position from Cicero's (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 5). Granted, there are certain habits acquired in the mode of nature, from mere repetition or frequent usage (*consuetudo*). The natural effects of such brute repetition cannot be denied; we commonly see them in our powers of memory and imagination. Yet Thomas denies that these are habits in the strict sense. Even if they were, he adds, they could not be called "virtues." In a similar vein, he argues that the Latin "moral" can signify either *mos* as custom (*consuetudo*) or *mos* as an inclination that has become quasi-natural for the individual (Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 1). When we speak of "moral virtue," moral has the second meaning, so that one should not imagine some essential connection between moral virtue and custom.

Thomas's distinction between habit and custom seems rather strained—and, from the perspective of ancient philosophy, hopelessly misguided. Augustine, however, would probably have appreciated Thomas's efforts. Why should Augustine object to defining virtue as a habit when the concept of habit itself has undergone such a significant change? At the same time, Augustine might reasonably wonder about the reasons for this conceptual revisionism. What advantages could there be to describing even God-given virtues as "habits"?²¹

To answer this question, it helps to move beyond the *Prima secundae* to Thomas's criticisms of Peter Lombard's teachings on charity (IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 2). Suppose that charity, as Peter had suggested, is not something created in the human soul. Suppose that human acts of charity come not from some divinely infused habit but rather from the soul's being moved directly by the Holy Spirit. No doubt Peter was trying to flag the unique excellence of charity, but to Thomas's mind, his position is still "ridiculous."²² If charity is not something created in the soul—if it is not a habit inclining the human agent to act from the love of God, not a "second nature," albeit divinely produced, so that acts of charity continue to run counter to the individual's inclinations—how could such acts ever be done easily, promptly, and with pleasure? How could acts of charity even be considered "voluntary"? If the person experiences no internal alteration but instead is moved by God to act contrary to her nature, how is she any more the cause of her own behavior than a rock is the cause of its own "behavior" when God snatches it from its natural descent toward the sewer and sends it shooting toward the heavens? In sum, Thomas does have his reasons for wanting all virtues, including the infused, classified as habits.

Only when he turns to the efficient cause of virtue does Thomas venture a clear criticism of the Augustinian definition: God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which the definition applies. Thus it says, "which God works in us without us." If this phrase were omitted, the remaining definition would be common to all virtues, both acquired and infused (Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4).²³ In other words, the textbook formula suffices for God-given virtues but lacks sufficient generality to cover the full range of virtues—a serious philosophical objection to its adequacy as a definition. Thomas never mentions that the narrowness of the definition was no mere oversight. Because Augustine himself regarded all the "virtues" of pagans as vices in disguise, he had no reason to seek a definition of virtue encompassing them.

Thomas's more generous assessment of non-Christians was common among scholastic theologians. Just the standard distinction between "acquired" and "infused" virtues sug-

gests that genuine virtue is not developed without God. This departure from the traditional perspective on the need to consider the acquired virtues as

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Soon after defining the virtues, Thomas argues that a virtue with respect to the will is not only to the will but also to the intellect, insofar as it is a habit of the soul insofar as it is a habit of the intellect (q. 56, a. 3). Intellect and art must therefore be distinguished in only a relative sense. The aim here is to show that one is a good man, not a good mechanic, or good at a specific role, from the fact that one's intellect is good. However, the intellect fall in the same way as the other faculties by their potentiality. For example, how know a doctor is a good doctor, a medical school graduate is an excellent doctor and a good teacher. An ambitious person has expertise to develop a cure for an untreatable poison. It is not to dispatch a messenger, adding to their burden, or to administer toxins from America. Intellectual virtues are not to be found in the moral virtues to be put to good use.

When he turns to the distinction of intellect and will, he reminds us that the intellect must function well, but the will. A person puts his intellect to good use (q. 57, a. 1). As virtue is wisdom, science is to grasp the truth of the natural mind, gives us none of these inessential relations. The ordered emotions might well have temper; so, too, the man (Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 1) of the practical

gests that genuine virtues can indeed be developed without God's grace. To understand why this departure from Augustine's teachings proves less than revolutionary when seen from the perspective of the *Summa* as a whole, we need to consider the place that naturally acquired virtues actually occupy.

VIRTUES IN A RELATIVE SENSE

Soon after defining virtue, Thomas argues that a virtue without qualification can belong only to the will or some other power of the soul insofar as it is moved by the will (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3). Intellectual habits such as science and art must therefore be considered virtues in only a relative sense (*secundum quid*). The aim here is to distinguish virtues that make one a good mathematician, painter, or auto mechanic, or good relative to some other specific role, from virtues that make one an all around good human being. Most habits of intellect fall in the first category, as evidenced by their potential for abuse. Consider, for example, how knowledge and skills acquired in medical school could go to make both an excellent doctor and a talented, undetected murderer. An ambitious toxicologist might use her expertise to develop antidotes for previously untreatable poisons; then again, she might use it to dispatch rivals for research funding by adding to their morning coffee little-known toxins from Amazonian jungles. While her intellectual virtues give her capacities for action not to be found in most people, she needs moral virtues to ensure that her capacities are put to good use.

When he turns to a more specific discussion of intellectual virtues, Thomas again reminds us that such habits make the mind function well, but they do not ensure that the person puts his mind to good use (Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 1). As virtues of the speculative mind, wisdom, science, and understanding enable us to grasp the truth. Art, a virtue of the practical mind, gives us skill in making things. Yet none of these intellectual virtues has any necessary relationship to a good will or well-ordered emotions. The most brilliant theorist might well have a streak of cruelty or a short temper; so, too, might the most expert craftsman (Ia IIae, q. 57, aa. 3–5). Prudence, a habit of the practical intellect, is the sole intellec-

tual virtue inseparable from moral virtue and hence from good moral character. Following Aristotle, Thomas argues that no one can have justice, courage, or any other moral virtue without prudence, nor can one have prudence without the moral virtues (Ia IIae, q. 58, aa. 4–5).

As philosophical readers continue with the *Prima secundae*, they will probably take an interest in the differences between moral and intellectual virtues, differences between the moral virtues themselves, the connection between prudence and moral virtue, and other topics addressed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But Aristotle's influence should not be overestimated, for the *Summa* posits a whole species of moral and intellectual virtues with the same names as virtues discussed by Aristotle (prudence, justice, temperance, and so on), but which are infused by God along with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. When Thomas refers to moral and intellectual virtues, he might therefore be referring either to naturally acquired virtues or to virtues that Christians possess due to God's grace. Should one focus on the division between acquired and infused virtues instead of the division between moral and intellectual virtues, the rest of the *Prima secundae* looks rather different.

In discussing the cardinal virtues, for example, Thomas considers the assertion of Macrius that they belong to four different genera: "political, purifying, purified, and exemplary" (Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 5).²⁴ Far from dismissing the suggestion that there are very different kinds of prudence, justice, and so on—not only different species but possibly different genera—Thomas supports it. He distinguishes sharply between virtues suited to our natural status as "political animals," disposing us to behave well in the social interactions characteristic of the present life, and the purifying virtues of persons striving for a likeness to God. The purifying virtues lie between the exemplary virtues, which truly belong to God alone, and the political virtues:

Prudence of this kind, by contemplating the divine, scorns all the things of this world and directs all its thoughts to divine truths; temperance sets aside what the body requires, insofar as nature allows; courage prevents the

soul from being terrified about losing the body as it approaches heavenly things; and justice lies in the consent of the whole soul to the way thus proposed.²⁵ (Ia IIae, q. 61, a. 5)

In a related article of his *Disputed Questions on the Cardinal Virtues*, Thomas adds that the political virtues fall short of the true essential character (*ratio*) of virtue. As moral inclinations without prudence fall short, so too, from a wider perspective, do moral virtues acquired together with prudence. Unless directed to God through charity, naturally acquired (alias "political") virtues are deficient in the truly essential character of virtue. The purifying virtues, by contrast, infused by God together with charity, are unqualifiedly perfect and make a person's actions good without qualification.²⁶

The *Prima secundae* moves more slowly. Having briefly sketched a distinction between the different species of cardinal virtues (political, purifying, and so on), Thomas turns to the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity (Ia IIae, q. 62). These are the sole virtues that have God as their object. Because they enable us to share in the divine nature and direct us to a happiness attainable in the present life, we cannot acquire them through our own resources; we can have them only through the grace of God.

Thomas follows St. Paul in praising charity or love as the greatest of the theological virtues (Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 4; 1 Cor 13:13). Although God infuses all three virtues together, one can still discern a conceptual order. Through faith, we believe what God has revealed of Himself and of the future life; through hope, we come to love Him as the source of our own happiness; but only through charity can we love Him as an end in Himself—as the supreme good, deserving of more love than any other, not merely as good for us. The love characteristic of hope is the love of desire; charity alone produces the genuine love of friendship. The crucial difference in motivation explains why Thomas describes charity as the "mother," "root," and "form" of all the virtues, even going so far as to declare that faith and hope are not virtues properly so called in the absence of charity (Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 66, a. 6).

Readers must wait until the next question, concerning the causes of virtue, to learn more about the prudence and moral virtues given by God. Thomas argues first that we need these infused virtues to attain the complete happiness of the afterlife, then that they differ not merely in degree of perfection but in kind (*species*) from virtues acquired naturally (Ia IIae, q. 63, aa. 3–4). The difference in kind derives partly from the different goods to which the virtues are ordered. While naturally acquired moral virtues make people well suited to the human affairs and earthly happiness that concern all—because we are all human—infused moral virtues make people well suited to the life Christians must live because they are Christians: persons belonging to the household of God, with love of God as the highest good, faith in God's word, and hope for the happiness of the afterlife. The difference in perceived goods and related motivations dictates different standards of conduct. This is Thomas's second reason for regarding naturally acquired and infused moral virtues as different species. For instance, while human reason alone establishes that people should not eat or drink in ways harmful to body or mind, the higher rule of divine law requires more in the way of abstinence (Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 4).

The next question (Ia IIae, q. 64), about how virtues observe a mean, only appears to shift the focus away from God-given virtues and narrow it to naturally acquired virtues. As Thomas previously transformed Aristotle's concept of virtue as a habit, he now transforms Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, so that it applies not only to naturally acquired virtues but also to infused moral virtues (Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; a. 4). Thus he lays the groundwork for the next, crucial discussion of how various virtues are connected with each other (Ia IIae, q. 65).

At first, Thomas seems to follow Aristotle in arguing that nobody can have a perfect moral virtue without prudence, nor can somebody have prudence without perfection in all the moral virtues.²⁷ Of course, one can have what people call "temperance" without what people call "courage" and vice versa. We often praise the "courage" of soldiers who habitually drink to excess, the "temperance" of abstemious but spineless neighbors, and so on. The

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character traits in question can indeed exist independently of each other; we might even regard them as imperfect virtues. But strictly speaking, they are only inclinations to certain kinds of actions or emotional responses that people have by native temperament, or frequent repetition or usage (*ex naturali complexione vel ex aliqua consuetudine*). Strictly speaking, someone who behaves well in one aspect of human life but not in another acquires a habit. Such a habit, however, will lack the essential character of a *virtue* unless accompanied by prudence (Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1).

The argument that no proper moral virtue can exist without prudence makes more sense if one recalls that a virtue cannot be put to bad use. The ability to face danger, in its own right, would go just as well to make a daring bank robber as an admirable war hero. A person needs prudence to judge correctly which dangers would be *good* to face. As moral virtue requires prudence, so, too, prudence requires moral virtue. A fearful person, with an excessive desire for safety, will naturally tend to judge too dangerous by half situations that it would actually be good to face. Someone's sense of justice cannot consistently govern her actions if she often lacks the courage to do the right thing.

To this point, Aristotle would have been nodding supportively. However, the very next article of the *Prima secundae* reapplies the distinction between perfect and imperfect virtues along lines undreamed of by Aristotle. Thomas argues that the moral virtues people acquire through their own natural resources can exist without charity, as was the case in many pagans. These virtues, however, are intrinsically imperfect—virtues merely in a relative sense. Only the moral virtues infused by God along with charity “perfectly and truly have the essential character (*ratio*) of virtue,” and therefore deserve to be called virtues without qualification (Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 2).²⁸ As no one can have the naturally acquired moral virtues without naturally acquired prudence, so no one can have the distinctively Christian (infused) moral virtues without the God-given theological virtue of charity.

Note that the naturally acquired moral virtues, which enable one to attain the imperfect happiness possible in human society in this life, are unified by the intellectual virtue of

prudence, just as Aristotle claimed. In contrast, what Thomas considers the only perfect, unqualified moral virtues are those unified by charity, a virtue of the will given by God. Again, the connection is reciprocal: we cannot have the infused moral virtues without charity, nor can we have charity without the infused moral virtues (Ia IIae, q. 65, aa. 2–3). At the same time, Thomas sees no essential connection between the infused virtues and the naturally acquired virtues. Christians might accordingly be well directed to the happiness of the afterlife and yet lacking in those virtues that enable a person to be happy in the ordinary human society of the present life. The virtues discussed by Aristotle, however useful to us now, are unnecessary for attaining our ultimate end of happiness in the company of God. Indeed, when Thomas argues in q. 65, a. 3, that “all the moral virtues are infused together with charity,”²⁹ he seems to have forgotten the kind of moral virtues discussed in the first article. The conversation has turned, by stages, so much away from Aristotle that the ancient conception of virtues as naturally acquired habits now represents an exception to the increasingly Christian “rule.”

The series of moves just sketched should help to explain why the *Summa* can be better understood as a conversation continuing over the course of many evenings than as the straightforward textbook discussion modern readers might expect. Naturally acquired habits described as perfect, unqualified virtues by comparison with habits unrelated to a good will and uninformed by prudence gradually emerge as imperfect virtues and virtues only in a relative sense by comparison with God-given habits. Scholastics would have been better able to appreciate the finesse of Thomas's gradual shift of focus and less likely to be confused by it.³⁰

The connection of the virtues represents another case where positions apparently endorsed earlier in the *Summa* are modified later. In Question 65, Thomas writes approvingly of Aristotle's claim that one cannot have prudence without having *all* the moral virtues. He seems to make an exception only for the large-scale virtues of magnificence and magnanimity, arguing that someone might have acquired all the other moral virtues and yet have lacked the opportunity to acquire these

special ones. On the other hand, a person who already has the virtue of generosity (*liberalitas*) would acquire the virtue of magnificence, and with very little effort, if he ever came into a large sum of money; so, generally speaking, all the moral virtues are connected (Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 1, ad 1). In Question 66, however, we find that generosity properly belongs to the same class of virtues as magnificence and magnanimity, so that the connection of the moral virtues must be reconsidered. Here Thomas distinguishes between the four principal or cardinal virtues and various secondary virtues, which merely serve to enhance these four. Generosity belongs to the second group. Thus, Thomas argues, a person cannot have the virtue of generosity without justice. (If I do not have a stable disposition to understand and give people what I owe them, how would I have a stable disposition to give them more than I owe?) In contrast, a person might indeed have the virtue of justice without generosity (Ia IIae, q. 66, a. 4, ad 1). In the *Secunda secundae*, Thomas explains that the virtue of justice might eventually be enhanced by the related virtue of generosity, but generosity is only a "potential" part of justice, not a species of justice or an "integral" part of it (IIa IIae, q. 117, a. 5). By distinguishing between the cardinal virtues and various secondary virtues potentially related to the cardinals, a distinction that figures prominently in the *Secunda secundae*, Thomas respects the common intuition that certain virtues are simply more essential than others to good moral character. Patristic writings often award the cardinal virtues this special status; the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not.

However marginalized the virtues discussed by Aristotle might become as the *Prima secundae* proceeds, Thomas never declares that Christians alone have genuine virtues. He continues to insist that persons of different faiths, even of no faith at all, be given moral credit where credit is due:

True unqualified virtue is that which directs one to mankind's principal good . . . and understood in this way, no true virtue can exist without charity. But if virtue is understood in relation to some particular end, something can be called a virtue without charity, insofar as it is directed to some particular good. However, if that particular good is not a true good, but

merely apparent, the virtue related to this good will not be a true virtue but merely a false likeness of virtue, as the prudence of the greedy is not a true virtue. . . . Yet if that particular good actually is a true good, such as the preservation of the community or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, although imperfect unless it is referred to the final and perfect good.³¹ (IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 7)

Thomas's account of God-given prudence and moral virtues nonetheless raises problems. Why does he posit this separate species of virtue? Other scholastics faulted him for multiplying virtues beyond necessity; only his most loyal followers defended him. Many of today's Thomists likewise regard the positing of infused moral virtues as a mistake by an otherwise brilliant philosopher-theologian.³² Of course, no moral theorist posits more virtues than he himself deems necessary. The key, then, is understanding the explanatory value that Thomas believes infused prudence and moral virtues offer.

COMPLEXITIES OF CHRISTIAN LIFE

We already know that Thomas endorses two ends of humankind: the limited happiness attainable in human society through our own natural resources, and the perfect happiness of the afterlife attainable by Christians with God's grace. The virtues discussed by Aristotle prove generally adequate with regard to the first kind of happiness. Were there no greater happiness possible, and no higher measure than human reason, the *Nicomachean Ethics* would be a fine guide to the moral life. As it is, Christians must regard the work as seriously flawed, not only in its ignorance of supernatural happiness and the God-given virtues ordered to it, but also as a guide to the moral life here and now. Those motivated by charity, who have faith in God and hope for happiness after death, must respect the rule of divine law governing their conduct. What Christians regard as reasonable—such as laypeople's observance of the Church's fasting regulations; or more poignantly, a life of religious poverty and complete sexual abstinence—could therefore look unreasonably ascetical to a non-Christian.

Note that some Christian life as a matter of motivations, with no prior other than prudence would not be acute influence of faith in Christianity would be relationship between man and God—chiefly in mind, so that one might be hard to distinguish from non-Christians. The Christian life to have people's day-to-day (for example) infused in kind from acquiring acknowledges and to the way Christians to avoid all sexual to be suspected of trying to awe others control, or otherwise instead of observing Christians, Thomas distinctive ends are dictate a mean made revealed by natural IIae, q. 63, a. 4; Ia Iae, q. 65, a. 3). What Christian might the prudent for a non-

At the same time respect for human attainable through in human society. pagan virtues as general But in insisting on kind, he sees moral credit that Christians Christians. The Christians themselves firmly resists any some dreary waiting to heaven—as if it mental to salvation ships, and work Christians were so many false goods are still general no less than other

How does this infused prudence a Thomas believes to are necessary for

Note that someone who regards the Christian life as a matter of beliefs, hopes, and motivations, with no observable effect on behavior other than prayer and church attendance, would not be acutely concerned about the influence of faith on people's everyday lives. Christianity would be mostly a private relationship between the individual conscience and God—chiefly a matter of one's heart and mind, so that one's everyday behavior might be hard to distinguish from the behavior of non-Christians. Thomas, however, expects Christianity to have a significant influence on people's day-to-day conduct. In describing (for example) infused temperance as different in kind from acquired temperance, he at once acknowledges and counters likely objections to the way Christians live. A pagan who chose to avoid all sexual activity might appropriately be suspected of finding sex repugnant, or of trying to awe others with his powers of self-control, or otherwise running to an extreme instead of observing the mean; however, for Christians, Thomas argues, with their own distinctive ends and motivations, reason will dictate a mean more exacting than that revealed by natural reason unaided by grace (Ia IIae, q. 63, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 3). What would be prudent for a Christian might thus appear, and even be, imprudent for a non-Christian.³³

At the same time, Thomas has a healthy respect for human nature and the happiness attainable through people's natural resources in human society. His steadfast defense of pagan virtues as genuine virtues attests to this. But in insisting on the two ends of humankind, he sees more at stake than the moral credit that Christians should award non-Christians. The earthly happiness of Christians themselves deserves attention. Thomas firmly resists any attempt to reduce life to some dreary waiting room on the train route to heaven—as if its value were purely instrumental to salvation, or as if the loves, friendships, and work Christians enjoy here and now were so many false goods. Purely human goods are still genuine goods, for Christians no less than other people.

How does this bear on the positing of infused prudence and moral virtues? While Thomas believes that only the infused virtues are necessary for happiness in the afterlife,

he also believes that people need the acquired virtues to be happy in the ordinary human society of this life.³⁴ Infused prudence does not enable one to deliberate well about everything under the sun, but only about things related to salvation.³⁵ People must learn from experience how to succeed in business, deploy troops in combat, and exercise judgment in other worldly affairs. Having as one's ultimate end the complete happiness possible only in the presence of God does not prevent one from regarding the happiness of this life as an intrinsic good. A good can be loved both for its own sake and for the sake of God, as an end in itself and yet as subordinate to a higher end (Ia IIae, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2). Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* explains how ends are architectonically ordered, with some as ends in their own right and yet subordinate to further ends. To deny that some good is the *ultimate* end is not necessarily to assert that it has, like a tetanus shot, merely instrumental value. Putting the Aristotelian lesson to theological use, Thomas envisions what might be described as the sanctification of a Christian's everyday life in human society.

In Thomas's view, the virtue of charity, which has God as its object and enables people to act from the love of God, exceeds every other virtue. As Aristotle was correct to praise the intellect as the power of the soul most crucial to attaining earthly happiness, so Augustine was correct to praise the will as the power most crucial to deserving eternal happiness. Because God far surpasses what the human intellect can comprehend, the love of God—a virtue of the will—is more essential to living as a Christian than any virtue of the intellect.³⁶ While this does not mean that all actions by non-Christians are sinful, it does mean that they cannot be "meritorious," that is, reckoned by God as deserving of reward in the afterlife (Ia IIae, q. 62, a. 4; IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 4). People are capable of merit only if they have, through God's grace, the end and motivations provided by the theological virtues. Those with the virtue of charity might nonetheless develop the natural virtues and exercise them both for their intrinsic worth and for the sake of God. When they do, Thomas says, the acts of these naturally acquired virtues are meritorious.³⁷ Thus a Christian's daily

conduct in selling cars, caring for patients, or teaching philosophy, and likewise, her routine behavior with family and friends, can express both her love for strictly human goods *and* her love for God.

To put it crudely, Thomas does not regard God as some jealous lover who insists that people care for no one but Him and for no happiness other than the happiness they could have in His presence. God Himself gave human beings bodies and emotions; God Himself made human beings social (political) animals, inclined by their very nature to seek happiness in the company of others of their kind. Heaven itself should not be regarded as some eternal tête-à-tête with God. Like Augustine, Thomas describes heaven as a community (or city), where Christians enjoy not only the company of God but also the company of the saints.

Thomas's efforts to legitimate both pagan virtues and Christian concern for worldly happiness are carefully balanced with efforts to avoid giving the erroneous impression that various Christian saints were morally inferior to ancient sages. Recall the words of St. Paul in Romans 7: "I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind." Also consider Augustine's description of temperance: "What is the activity of virtue here but a perpetual war with vices?—not external vices but internal, not alien but clearly our very own—a war waged especially by what is called *sôphrosynê* in Greek and *temperantia* in Latin which bridles our fleshly lusts lest they drag our will to consent to crimes of every sort."³⁸

In fact, what Aristotle calls temperance (*sôphrosynê*) produces harmony between the possessor's emotions and rational judgment. The temperate person no longer need struggle to resist temptation because he no longer feels tempted to do anything bad. While Aristotle recognizes that some people have emotions that they must perpetually work to control, he labels this state of character "continence" (*enkrateia*) and distinguishes it from virtue.³⁹ Should we conclude, then, that saints praised as a virtue what ancient philosophers judged second-rate—or worse, that Augustine and Paul were themselves second-rate in moral character?

Thomas's discussion of merit alone should help to answer the question. But he has at least two more answers. First, the saints, with infused virtues, judge themselves by *higher* standards than pagans. Because they measure themselves by the rule of divine law, they inevitably see more shortcomings in themselves.⁴⁰ Second, naturally acquired, infused moral virtues have different effects on one's emotions. Like Aristotle, Thomas holds that virtues acquired naturally, through long practice, work to eliminate contrary emotions. In time the agent feels much less troubled by his emotions and comes to find virtuous actions pleasant. Infused moral virtues, Thomas explains, can indeed have such an effect (that they *can* be important), but they might not have it immediately. Christians can continue to feel internal conflict and have difficulty in exercising the virtues given by God (Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2–3).⁴¹ Infused moral virtues nonetheless provide a Christian with the strength to lead a good life (emotionally tumultuous or not) and keep her from feeling distress (*tristitia*). Should anyone object that virtues are supposed to make the possessor find virtuous actions uniformly enjoyable, Thomas reminds us that even Aristotle defended a more qualified position.⁴²

Many of Thomas's contemporaries believed it sufficient to posit only naturally acquired virtues and the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.⁴³ In contrast to Augustine, they acknowledged naturally acquired habits as genuine (albeit limited) virtues in pagans; in support of Augustine, they suggested that Christians do not have such virtues—because any virtues naturally acquired by Christians are redirected to the end of charity (in effect, "supernaturalized") through divine infusion of the theological virtues. I have already presented various reasons why Thomas declined to adopt this view. The one point that remains to be considered is his concern for a fine-grained analysis of moral actions.

According to Thomas, we should distinguish between the love of God produced by charity and actions of other virtues performed for the sake of God. For example, when a Christian abstains from food, drink, or sex, she might well do so for the sake of God; but having God as the final cause of such actions

does not prevent perance. Of course the virtue of "mandated" by the charity may also perfection in Thomas wants to blur the distinction material causes; mandated acts; be perfections of v having distinct many different a of virtues, relat each with its sp essentially one a

More precise sent a gain in m eral lesson was l who suggests th the sake of mon intemperance th uses it to disting ous actions by C the sake of God temperance, so nence should ne tian acts of char meat with loving bor for the sake way to go tow unique status a "mother" of all

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the H for their support and research into the scholastic ethics of this larger project.

Notes

¹Arist. *Eth. Nic.*

²Arist. *Cat.* 8b2

1105a34–35, 1152

³A few examples in *malorum*, 5.25; M 12.3.

⁴See, for exam

does not prevent them from being acts of temperance. Of course, the same acts “elicited” by the virtue of temperance may be “commanded” by the virtue of charity. Perfection in charity may also be needed extrinsically for perfection in temperance. Nevertheless, Thomas wants us to be precise in describing the moral actions of Christians. Should one blur the distinctions among formal, final, and material causes; between elicited and commanded acts; between intrinsic and extrinsic perfections of virtues, one runs the risk of having distinct virtues collapse into just so many different aspects of charity.⁴⁴ A plurality of virtues, related and interdependent, but each with its specific goods, would become essentially one and the same virtue.

More precise descriptions of actions represent a gain in moral analysis. While the general lesson was learned by studying Aristotle, who suggests that illicit sexual intercourse for the sake of money be considered less an act of intemperance than an act of greed, Thomas uses it to distinguish between different virtuous actions by Christians.⁴⁵ Lenten fasting for the sake of God remains “materially” an act of temperance, so that Christian acts of abstinence should never be conflated with Christian acts of charity. Confuse declining to eat meat with loving God, or loving one’s neighbor for the sake of God, and one still has some way to go toward understanding charity’s unique status as the foundation, form, and “mother” of all the virtues.

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Notes

¹Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1106b36–1107a2.

²Arist. *Cat.* 8b28–9a4. See also *Eth. Nic.* 1100b2, 1105a34–35, 1152a29–33.

³A few examples: Cic. *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, 5.25; Macrobius. *Sat.* 7.9; August. *De civ. D.* 12.3.

⁴See, for example, August. *De civ. D.* 21.16.

⁵For an excellent study of Augustine’s treatment of *consuetudo* see John Prendiville, “The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine,” *Traditio* 28 (1972): 29–99. For present purposes, the reader might simply recall that Augustine’s famous *Confessions* bears eloquent testimony to the negative role of habituation, both in delaying his own conversion (“Lord, give me chastity and continence, but not yet”) and in tormenting him with what he regarded as sinful yearnings even after his baptism. Consider, for example, *Conf.* 10.30: “Assuredly you command that I contain myself from ‘the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life’ [1 Jn 2:16]. You commanded me also to abstain from fornication, and in the matter of marriage, you advised me a better course, though you allowed me a lesser good. And since you gave me the power, it was done, even before I became a dispenser of your sacrament. Yet there still live in my memory images of those things of which I have already spoken so much which my long habit (*consuetudo*) has fixed there. When I am awake they beset me, though with no great power, but in sleep they not only seem pleasant but even to the point of consent and the likeness of the act itself.”

⁶August. *Div. quaest.* 1. 31; Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.53.

⁷August. *Retract.* 1.25.

⁸“Et Commentator dicit in 3. de Anima, quod habitus est, quo quis agit cum voluerit.” See below, n. 17.

⁹A few examples: *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1 (Moos, 696–718), and d. 34, q. 3 (Moos, 1157–68); *In III Ethicorum.*, lect. 6 (Leonine, 135–39); *De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 1 (Marietti, 707–10).

¹⁰In ST Ia IIae, q. 52, where he discusses the growth of habits, Thomas returns to speaking chiefly of naturally acquired habits. Although the change of focus might prove rather disorienting for the reader, Thomas does indicate that the special case of virtuous habits will be considered later: “Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra dicitur”; “Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, infra dicitur” (q. 52, aa. 1–2).

¹¹On important developments during this period see Cary Nederman, “Nature, Ethics, and the Doctrine of ‘Habitus’: Aristotelian Moral Psychology in the Twelfth Century,” *Traditio* 45 (1989–1990): 87–110, and Marcia Colish, “Habitus Revisited: A Reply to Cary Nederman,” *Traditio* 48 (1993): 77–92.

¹²“Aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est [Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 5]. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde

tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina: sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus."

¹³For some examples, see ST Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 6; Ia, IIae, q. 4, aa. 5-6; Ia, IIae, q. 62, a. 1; Ia, IIae, q. 63, a. 3.

¹⁴On the face of it, the *Summa* describes animals as so many appetite-driven robots, incapable of calculation, self-assertion, or much of the behavior that people routinely attribute to their cats and dogs. This is a mistake; it might be better to say that Thomas simply believes animals act "on principle." Sadly, limitations of space preclude further discussion of this topic.

¹⁵Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1100b35-1101a8, 1146a9-11, 1150b32-34.

¹⁶See above, n. 5.

¹⁷It seems no small irony that Thomas should cast Averroes as his authority for the doctrine that habits, by their very nature, are principally related to the will. In the passage Thomas cites repeatedly, Averroes's actual contention is that a habit is that whereby one may *understand* (versus the more general "act") *quando voluerit*, which should perhaps be translated as "when one wants" or "when one wishes" rather than as "when one wills," given that Thomas's own conception of the will is just as alien to Averroes as it is to Aristotle. Commenting on Aristotle's account of the intellect, Averroes is only pointing out that understanding, an intellectual "habit," frees the agent from dependence on external aid or stimulation. See Averroes, *In Aristotelis De Anima, Lib. III*, n. 18 [re 430a15-16]: "Et oportet addere in sermone: secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne ex se et quando voluerit. Haec enim est diffinitio habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat per ipsum illud quod est sibi proprium ex se et quando voluerit, absque quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco."

¹⁸In *III Ethicorum*, lect. 4 (Leonine, 129-30). For further discussion of the difference between Thomas and Aristotle on this topic see Charles Kahn, "Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine," in *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. John Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 234-59, esp. 239-45, and my *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 156-74, esp. 171-74.

¹⁹"Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur." Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, d. 27, chap. 1, d. 27, q. 5 (ed. Ignatius Brady [Rome: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas Grottaferrata,

1971], 480): "Virtus est, ut ait Augustinus, bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur."

²⁰"Dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis." In a disputation on the same topic Thomas was more straightforward, mentioning the chief problem with the definition at the outset. See *De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 2: "Dicendum quod ista definitio complectitur definitionem virtutis, etiam si ultima particula omittatur; et convenit omni virtuti humanae" (Marietti, 710-14).

²¹Note that gifts of the Holy Spirit are likewise classified as habits (Ia IIae, q. 68, a. 3).

²²*De caritate*, q. un, a. 1 (Marietti, 753-57); cf. Ia IIae, q. 23, a. 2. The withering term of dismissal, "ridiculous," appears in the disputed questions but not in the *Summa theologiae*. This is only one of many cases where the "host" of the *Summa*, a textbook written for beginning theology students, proves somewhat less diplomatic when debating with peers.

²³"Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, 'quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.' Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis."

²⁴In *somnium Scipionis*, a commentary by Macrobius on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio*, represents a Neoplatonic influence on Aquinas's moral thought now widely ignored. Thomas cites Macrobius repeatedly in the *Secunda secundae*, just as he often cites Cicero himself.

²⁵"Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinarum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, in quantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam."

²⁶*De virt. card.*, q. un, a. 2: "Secundus autem gradus virtutum est illarum quae attingunt rationem rectam, non tamen attingunt ad ipsum Deum per caritatem. Hae quidem aliquantulum sunt perfectae per comparisonem ad bonum humanum, non tamen sunt simpliciter perfectae, quia non attingunt ad primam regulam, quae est ultimus finis, ut Augustinus dicit *contra Iulianum*. Unde et deficient a vera ratione virtutis; sicut et moralis inclinationes absque prudentia deficient a vera ratione virtutis. Tertius gradus est virtutum simpliciter perfectarum, quae sunt simul cum caritate; hae enim virtutes faciunt actum hominis simpliciter bonum, quasi at-

tingentem usque ad Deum. Igitur quod similitudines virtutum sunt, tales formae experientiales caritas inclinat. In actu virtutum, qui importat omnes (818-819).

²⁷Arist. *Eth. Nic.*

²⁸"perfecte et ver-

²⁹"cum caritate simpliciter morales."

³⁰For example, *Summa* might assume how virtues endure naturally acquired as well as states explicitly in a way only to infused virtues; *De virt. card.*, q. 1.

³¹"Virtus vera simpliciter ad principale bonum virtus potest esse simpliciter virtus, secundum quod particularem, sic potest esse, in quantum bonum: sed si illud verum bonum, secundum in ordine ad hoc bonum falsa similitudo virtutum avarorum prudentia particulare sit verum bonum, vel aliquid huiusmodi, sed imperfecta, nisi virtutum bonum."

³²For admirably Lottin, *Principles de l'Abbaye du Mont-tieth-century authors reveal their doubts mentioning this as passing or even altogether silence is especially cal authors who separate philosophy from history independently. I think would have frowned*

³³See *De virt. in* Thomas argues that are means of reason pagan vice of *insensu*

³⁴*De virt. in com* dum quod ad utrumque; ad naturalia superius positis [in insuper, ad naturalia est supra naturam movetur ex hoc quod ita agit in nobis,

tingentem usque ad ultimum finem. . . . Oportet igitur quod similiter cum caritate infundantur habituales formae expedite producentes actus ad quos caritas inclinat. Inclinat autem caritas ad omnes actus virtutum, quia cum sit circa finem ultimum, importat omnes actus virtutum” (Marietti, 818–819).

²⁷Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1144b36.

²⁸“perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis.”

²⁹“cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes morales.”

³⁰For example, while modern readers of the *Summa* might assume that Thomas’s discussion of how virtues endure in the afterlife applies to naturally acquired as well as infused moral virtues, he states explicitly in another work that he is referring only to infused virtues. See also ST Ia IIae, q. 67, a. 1; *De virt. card.*, q. 1, a. 4 (Marietti, 825–28).

³¹“Virtus vera simpliciter est illa, quae ordinat ad principale bonum hominis. . . ; et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate: sed si accipiatur virtus, secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate, in quantum ordinatur ad aliquod particulare bonum: sed si illud particulare bonum non sit verum bonum, sed apparens, virtus etiam quae est in ordine ad hoc bonum, non erit vera virtus, sed falsa similitudo virtutis: sicut non est vera virtus avarorum prudentia. . . . Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis, vel aliquid huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale, et perfectum bonum.”

³²For admirably candid reservations, see Odon Lottin, *Principles de morale*, vol. 2 (Louvain: Éditions de l’Abbaye du Mont César, 1947), 213–25. Twentieth-century authors are usually more prone to reveal their doubts about infused moral virtues by mentioning this aspect of Thomas’s ethics only in passing or even altogether ignoring it. The policy of silence is especially pronounced among philosophical authors who seek to abstract Thomas’s moral philosophy from his moral theology and treat it independently. I think it safe to say that Thomas would have frowned upon this practice.

³³See *De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 13, ad 6, where Thomas argues that Christian poverty and virginity are means of *reason*, not to be confused with the pagan vice of *insensibility* (Marietti, 750).

³⁴*De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 1, ad 11: “Dicendum quod ad utrasque operationes habitu indigemus; ad naturales quidem tribus rationibus superius positis [in corp. art.]; ad meritorius autem insuper, ad naturalis potentia elevetur ad id quod est supra naturam ex habitu infuso. Nec hoc remouetur ex hoc quod Deus in nobis operatur; quia ita agit in nobis, quod et nobis agimus; unde

habitu indigemus, quo sufficienter agere posimus” (Marietti, 710).

³⁵*De virt. card.*, q. un., a. 2, ad 3 (Marietti, 819).

³⁶*De caritate*, q. un., a. 3, ad 13 (Marietti, 762).

³⁷*De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 10, ad 4 (Marietti, 736).

³⁸August. *De civ. D.*, 19.4.

³⁹Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1145a35–36.

⁴⁰For discussion of this point see Norman Kretzmann, “Warring against the Law of My Mind: Aquinas on Romans 7,” in *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, ed. T. Morris (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 172–95.

⁴¹My explanation of this point draws on Thomas’s *De virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 10, ad 14–15.

⁴²Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1117b9–19.

⁴³Both Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, leading secular masters at Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, argued at length against positing infused moral virtues. For helpful selections from their works, as well as from works by other masters critical of Thomas on this issue, see Odon Lottin, “Les vertus morales infuses pendant la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle,” in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 3, pt. 2 (Louvain, Gembloux, 1949), 487–534. See also Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, suppl. dist. 36, in *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, ed. Allan Wolter (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 414–17; and especially the strong criticism by Thomas’s fellow Dominican, Durand of St. Pourçain, in *Durandi a Sancto Porciano in Sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi commentarium*, III, dist. 33, q. 6 (Lyons, 1587), 613–14.

⁴⁴For discussion of these distinctions see *De caritate*, q. un., aa. 3, 5 (Marietti, 760–62, 765–66).

⁴⁵Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 113024–26.

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The In

The link between and moral best. Histor whose moral hero whose intellectual meager. Similarly brilliant scientists whose moral bear portion to their co respect the testim in favor of the drawn by Aristot *comachean Ethics*, our emotions, des tues) and virtues scientific, artistic (*intellectual virtues*)

Thomas Aquin distinction between tue in a section striking in its co (*intellectus*), scienc wisdom (*sapientia*) single article (Ia I just one article (virtue of art (*ars*)). from Thomas's ra particular moral a of which occupie Furthermore, the *prudentia*) are disc tion of possible respect as well, the cally from that o virtues, which nev fit of such a contr

Some vital diff intellectual virtues logical counterpart to this in Ia IIa